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Share options have become a popular, frequently rewarding and incentive-providing 
form of remuneration for executive directors and other employees. Previous 
international research has shown that the firm's decision to grant share options may be 
influenced by its financial reponing situation; its tax position; the existence of conflicting 
interests between management and other stakeholders; as well as the firm's size and 
liquidity situation. 
The reasons why the conflict of interest has been found to be significantly associated 
with the granting of share options is because share options can align the interests of 
management with those of the shareholders and in so doing reduce the extent of agency 
costs. The lack of an accounting requirement to recognise share options as an expense 
has also been found to influence the finn's decision to grant share options depending on 
its financial reponing position. Ibe firm's tax position has also been associated with the 
decision to grant options based on the fact that finns cannot obtain a tax deduction for 
the value of share options granted. Finally, large finns with liquidity constraints have 
been found to be more likely to grant share options, due to the lack of available cash 
reserves for the payment of salaries. 
There has been no research as to whether the above explanatory variables influence the 
granting of share options by South African finns. The objective of this study is to 
investigate whether the variables that were identified internationally as being associated 
with share option grants apply to grants made to South African executive directors. 
This study examines whether the extent of share options granted is associated with 
various financial reponing and tax indicators, proxies for agency costs, the firm's size and 
its liquidity. Data from 61 firms over 2000 and 2001 was obtained. A total of 33 firms 
that granted share options were examined together with 28 firms that did not. The value 
of share options was measured using the dividend-adjusted Black Scholes model, and the 
dependent variable was calculated to be the value of share options granted during the 
year divided by the sum of the value of share options granted and the annual cash salary 
paid to the executives. This variable was regressed against thineen independent 











The results of this research indicate strongly that the larger the finn and the greater the 
extent of future growth opportunities (represented by the ratio of research and 
development to total assets), the more likely it is that finns will grant options, both of 
which are consistent with existing theoty. Option granting behaviour was also found to 
differ across industries and there was some evidence that the more difficult it is to 
monitor executive's performance (represented by the ratio of the variance in return on 
equity to the variance in share price), the more likely it is that the finn will grant options. 
Variables that were statistically significant but in the opposite direction to what was 
expected were growth in assets and the market-to-book ratio, both of which were 
negatively correlated with option granting behaviour. TIlls inconsistency may however 
be due to the fact that the data from the sample may not be a true reflection of the 
population. 
Financial reporting incentives, tax disincentives, liquidity, and two proxies for agency 
costs (the variance of market-adjusted returns and the ratio of the variance of market-
adjusted returns to total returns) were not found to be significantly associated with 
option granting. TIlls suggests that the lack of a requirement to recognise share options 
as an expense; no deductions of share options for tax purposes; the fact that executive's 
choose to invest in projects that yield highly variable returns; and that finns that have a 
large amount of noise in their share price relative to the market, do not influence the 
decision to grant share options in South Africa. 
It therefore appears that the key drivers for granting share options to South African 
executive directors are finn size, unclear signals between earnings performance and the 
quality of manager's decisions and the desire to reduce agency costs by encouraging 
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The use of share options as a form of remuneration for executive directors and 
employees has become a popular means of compensation in South Africa and 
throughout the world. Share options give the holder of the option the right to acquire 
shares at a future date at a specified price. ~They therefore provide an incentive for 
management to increase the value of the firm so that they can exercise their options at a 
price that is lower than the prevailing share price. Share options have frequently been 
the source of media attention as a result of the various efficiencies and inefficiencies of 
share option schemes in practice. ~There has also been much debate within the standard 
setting bodies worldwide concerning whether share options should be expensed in the 
income statement for accounting purposes or merely disclosed as a note in the financial 
statements, as is the current accounting treatment. 
Various studies have been conducted overseas to determine the factors that influence the 
decision of whether or not to grant share options. Empirical evidence (see for example 
Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987); Gaver and Gaver (1993); Smith and Watts (1992); 
Lambert and Larcker (1987); Sloan (1991); and Klassen and Mawani (2000)) has 
suggested that finns grant share options to align management and shareholder goals, 
thereby reducing agency costs. Proxies for agency costs have included the variance of 
shareholder returns; long-term investment and growth opportunities; the executive's age; 
the firm's debt-equity ratio and beta; the unexplained variance in the firm's share price 
that is attributable to market forces and the noise in earnings relative to share price. 
These proxies for agency costs have all been found to be significantly associated with 
share option granting. Furthermore, research has shown that option granting behaviour 
differs between finns in different industries (see Smith and Watts (1992) and Ely (1991)). 
Since the value of share options granted need not be expensed by the firm for 
accounting purposes, the financial reporting position performance of the firm was also 










(1995) and Klassen and Mawani (2000). The firm's tax position may also influence the 
decision of whether or not to grant options as there is no tax deduction for share options 
granted by companies in South Africa, as was the case in the study conducted by Klassen 
and Mawani (2000). 
Finally, research conducted by Klassen and Mawani (2000); Gaver and Gaver (1993); 
Smith and Watts (1992) and Matsunaga (1995) suggests that the firm's size may also 
influence the finn's option granting behaviour, as may its liquidity (see Yermack (1995)). 
No known research has been conducted in South Africa to determine whether the 
factors identified in the abovementioned international studies influence option granting 
by South African finns. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Objective 
The lack of information regarding the variables driving the granting of share options in 
South Africa formed the basis of this study. Those variables identified in international 
studies explaining the reasons for share option grants have not been tested in South 
Africa. Stakeholders of South African firms are therefore unable to anticipate whether 
firms are more or less likely to grant share options based on its current circumstances. 
The objective of this study is to determine which of the identified variables influence 
share option granting, in particular those granted to South African executive directors. 
Specifically, this study seeks to determine whether firms are more likely to grant share 
options to executive directors (a) in order to reduce agency costs, and/or (b) to capitalise 
on minimal financial reporting requirements, and/or (c) to take advantage of their 
taxable income position. 
With regard to (a) above, there has been some evidence in South Africa that firms use 
share options to reduce agency costs (see Hall (1998)). This study will hopefully provide 
funher insight regarding this theory, and concurrently reveal which agency cost proxies 
are significantly associated with option granting. With regard to (b) and (c) above, this 
study seeks to ascenain whether a firm's financial performance or tax position are indeed 











the timing of remuneration committees' decisions to grant share options. They may also 
have implications for the lASB, users and pre parers of financial statements with respect 
to the impact that the lack of a requirement to expense share options has had on share 
option granting behaviour. Depending on the outcome of this study, the South African 
Legislature may consider the introduction of a tax deduction for share options. 
Furthermore the results of this study may provide some explanation for the failure of 
some share option schemes in South Africa. Finally, this study may enable stakeholders 
to anticipate share option grants if the results reveal those factors that are significantly 
associated with option granting. 
1.3 Report Structure 
The report is contained in the next four chapters. In Chapter 2 a discussion of share 
options and their prevalence within practice is made, followed by an outline of the 
agency, accounting and taxation issues relating to share options and finally the results of 
the previous research are addressed. 
Chapter 3 details the variables selected for this study and how they were calculated, and 
reviews the methodology used in this study based on two different techniques. Chapter 
4 reports the results of this study, compares these to the international research results 
and discusses possible reasons for any inconsistencies between the results. Finally in 












LITERA TIJRE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The use of share options, as a fOffi1 of compensation has become a common feature in 
South African executive directors' and employees' remuneration packages. Data 
gathered for this study revealed that 93% of the one hundred largest! South African 
companies make use of share option schemes to remunerate directors and/or employees. 
In the United States, 97% of the companies in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index 
granted options to their executive directors in 1998. The value of these options 
comprised 40% of total remuneration for the S&P 500 Chief Executive Officers (Suxk 
Options (or expropriating tk shareJxiders) 2001). 
'The inherent conflict of interest between management and shareholders is commonly 
known as the agency problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) originally identified agency 
theory, referring to the costs of agency. Agency costs refer to the costs of the conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders, and can include lost opportunities for 
shareholders due to management acting in their own self-interest, corporate expenditure 
on luxurious and unnecessary goods that benefit management but cost the shareholders, 
or expenses that arise from the need to monitor management's actions such as external 
audit fees. Agency costs are reduced when management's goals are closely aligned with 
those of the shareholders. The way in which management is compensated can playa 
major role in aligning these goals. Studies conducted by Haugen and Senbet (1981), 
Hemmer (1993) and Hail and Liebman (1998) have ail concluded that share options as a 
constituent of executive compensation aids the alignment of shareholder and 
management goals. 
A funher reason for the granting of share options by rums may be that current 
accounting standards do not require fiffi1s to recognise share options as a cost to the firm 
in the income statement, or elsewhere. This treatment has recently been the source of 
much debate in the international accounting arena. In terms of the current treatment for 
share options in South Africa, the only accounting entry passed will be when the share 
options are exercised: cash is debited and equity credited with the consideration received 











on Issue. However, this accounting treatment may soon change as a result of an 
exposure draft, ED 160 Share-based Paymmt (SAICA 2002), which was recently released by 
the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) based on the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) equivalent: ED 2. ED 2/ED 160 
proposes the recognition of share options as an expense at the fair value of the options 
granted. Whether or not this recognition method is appropriate is outside the scope of 
this dissenation, however, whether the lack of such a reponing requirement influences 
the decision to grant share options will be considered. 
A disadvantage of granting share options in South Africa is that finns cannot get a tax 
deduction for the cost of the option. Options are not considered to be an expense by 
the South African Revenue Service, and, apart from any specific provision to the 
contrary, deductions are only permitted for expenses actually incurred in the production 
of income, not of a capital nature (Huxham 2002). 
Thus, internationally, share options, are seen to align management and shareholders' 
interests by reducing agency costs. In addition, they offer financial reponing benefits as 
no expense is recognised, but they are a disincentive in tax regimes where a deduction 
cannot be claimed for tax purposes. It is not clear whether these three factors are in fact 
the reason why South African finns grant share options. 
This chapter will continue with a discussion of the history of share options, the 
relationship between share options and agency theory, as well as the financial reporting, 
taxation, and agency issues surrounding share options. It will conclude with a review of 
the previous research that has been conducted in this area, focusing on the variables that 











b2 Background: Share Options 
2.2.1 Fonns of Share-Based Payment 
Share-based payment plans are often intricate and structured in ways that incorporate 
different forms of payment such as a combination of share options and share purchase 
plans. Typical share option plans include either 'plain vanilla' plans which simply give a 
director or employee the right to purchase a number of shares at a fixed price within a 
defined time span. Other share option plans are known as performance vesting share 
options that only vest2 when certain performance criteria (such as the attainment of a 
specified return on equity) are achieved. If these performance criteria are attained prior 
to the beginning of the vesting period and the firm has a performance-accelerated vesting 
plan, then early vesting of the share options occurs (IASB 2000). 
Apart from share option plans, a number of other share-based payment plans are used by 
firms. Share appreciation rights (SARs) are awards granted to employees and directors 
equal to the excess of the market value at a specified future date over a stated price, 
payable in cash or shares or a combination of both. Share purchase plans allow the 
employee to purchase a specific number of shares usually at fair market value at a 
specified future date. Phantom share plans are deferred bonus plans whereby the 
employee receives phantom shares, the value of which fluctuates with the firm's actual 
share price (or another indicator), which are paid out in the form of a cash bonus at a 
specific future date (IASB 2000). 
Apart from share options, all other forms of share-based compensation have been 
excluded from the scope of this study and will hence not form part of this literature 
reVIew. 
2.2.2 Share Option Schemes in Practice 
Share option schemes involve the offer of nonmarketable share options to directors 
and! or employees either on a general or selective basis. The number of shares that a 
director or employee is entitled to is at the discretion of the firm. The shares are usually 
available during a specified period decided by the firm. The employee is locked into 











the employee from any fluctuation in the market value. Under traditional share option 
schemes, the employer firm will form an interviws trust (" share trust") for the benefit of 
its employees. The share trust either purchases shares on the open market or subscribes 
for shares in the firm (The Professional- Share scb:mes can sting 2000). These shares are 
available for purchase if the option holder decides to exercise his option. 
The JSE Securities Exchange has experienced a downward trend in share prices over the 
last two years and many employees have thus been holding out-of-the-mono/ share 
options. Thus firms have often had to either issue new shares at a lower price or cancel 
the existing incentive scheme (Wood 2002). Consequently, this has had a negative affect 
on employees' morale and many have opted to seek employment at competitor firms. 
There have also been reports of directors exercising their options ahead of profit 
warnings to the detriment of both staff and shareholders (Kruger 2002). Furthermore, a 
number of major US companies in the Information Technology (IT) sector have been 
involved in litigation for firing employees with share options so as to prevent them from 
exercising those options (Van Niekerk 2000). These reports suggest that share option 
plans have not always successfully aligned management and shareholder goals. 
Further evidence of a counterproductive share option scheme is that of Dimension Data 
(Didata), whereby executive directors were able to benefit by cashing in their options 
before the value of the company declined. During 2000, 39 million share options were 
granted to employees and directors, but after the IT crash in 2001 and Didata's 
unattained performance targets, the directors halved their annual salaries, received no 
bonuses, and sawall the share options granted in 2000 lapse. However, by the time the 
announcement regarding the lapsing of share options was made the executive directors 
had already exercised many of their options and had greatly benefited. The Executive 
Chairman Jeremy Ord made a gain of $12 million on his options and the other executive 
directors made gains of more than $7 million each (Bidoli 2002). 
Option re-pricing has become a frequent occurrence in South Africa, particularly with 
small to medium sized investment banks and is a further area where management's goals 
do not appear to be in line with those of the shareholders. This method of re-pricing 
out-of-the-money options to make them valuable again has been quoted to be "cynical at 
2 Vesting occurs when the grantee of the option becomes unconditionally entitled to the option. 












best, corrupt at worst" (Cohen 2001b). One of the most extraordinary re-pricing 
incidents seen in South Africa was when Metcash Ltd adjusted a RS,49 strike price to a 
mere Rl,30 in Apri12001 (Henderson 2001). It is argued that from a moral perspective, 
executive directors should endure volatility in share prices along with shareholders, and 
that re-pricing is only appropriate when there is a fundamental structural change (Cohen 
2001b). 
The purpose of compensating executive directors and employees with share options is to 
attempt congruence of shareholder and management goals. The negative affects of 
poorly structured, ineffective share option schemes with terms that subsequently change 
to the benefit of management but not shareholders, has not helped in achieving this 
congruency. 
2.2.3 Recent Trends 
As a result of the problems discussed above, firms have begun to structure their schemes 
in such a way that aligns them to their core business strategies, the retention of staff and 
with a focus on long-term performance (Wood 2002). This has resulted in increasingly 
complex share option schemes. 
An example of the increasing complexity is the scheme used by South African Breweries 
(SAB). The company operates two executive schemes: an Inland Revenue4 Approved 
Share Option Scheme up to an approved limit and an unapproved scheme for options in 
excess of the Inland Revenue limit. Options under both schemes are granted at market 
value and the vesting of options is dependent on the company's performance relative to 
an economic indicator. SAB recently changed the terms of the scheme with respect to 
the economic indicator, such that any previously granted options vest when the growth 
in Earnings per Share (EPS) is equal to or greater than the change in the UK Retail Price 
Index (RPI) plus 3% compounded over a three year period until ten years after grant. 
TIlls performance requirement is subject to testing at three, four and five year intervals. 
Regarding future option grants, half of any additional amount granted will vest when 
EPS growth is greater than or equal to RPI plus 4% and the other half at RPI plus 5%, 
subject to testing at years four and five. Any unvested options at the end of year five 











Noticeable trends in recent South African schemes have been the regular offers of 
options on an annual or biannual basis as opposed to substantial and irregular allocations. 
In addition, the time before the options vest has declined to between two and five years 
from the previous five and seven year vesting periods. Within this time period, options 
that are designed to reward performance tend to vest earlier than those that focus on the 
retention of staff. Finally, the schemes seem to be geared to a smaller group of 
participants. This group is now typically restricted to top management and directors 
(Wood 2002). 
An alternative theory is that share option schemes tend to be overused and should be de-
emphasized in favour of bonus plans that are structured to make executive directors and 
employees think and act like owners. G.B Stewart III suggests that the participants of 
share option schemes should be restricted to executive directors and top management as 
they are generally financially literate, unlike many other employees that incorrectly believe 
accounting measures of earnings or cash flows drive their company's share price. 
Stewart believes that using these measures as financial targets sets improper goals for 
firms (Stewart 2002). 
In addition Stewart argues that at some point investors will fully anticipate the firm's 
future growth prospects, resulting in a steady share price that will diminish the 
attractiveness of share options. He therefore suggests a bonus scheme, that is a set 
percentage of the increase in economic profit or Economic Value Added (EVA)5 after 
subtracting the cost of capital and adjusting for material accounting distortions. 
Furthermore, there should be no cap on the allowed magnitude of the bonus, so that the 
unlimited increase in the bonus can promote entrepreneurship whilst the unlimited 
decrease in the bonus value can discourage excessive risk taking. Finally, a portion of 
large bonuses should be carried forward and paid over time subject to forfeiture if future 
performance targets are not attained. This provides a means of sustaining performance; 
discourages short-term gaming; lengthens decision horizons and holds managers 
accountable for delivering expected returns year on year (Stewart 2002). 
4 Inland Revenue is the authorised tax-collecting body in the United Kingdom 
5 EVA was developed in the early 1980's by Stem Stewart & Co and is a measure of economic profit. 
EV A is calculated as the net profit after tax less a charge for the capital invested in the business. The 
charge for the capital invested in the business is the weighted average cost of capital multiplied by the 











Thus, although there is no consensus as to the most appropriate compensation structure 
for the various categories of employees, it is clear that share options are considered to be 
an effective incentive strategy for executive directors and top management. 
2.3 Reasons for Granting Share Options 
Previous literature suggests that the agency problem, financial reporting incentives and 
tax disincentives have influenced the decision by firms whether to grant options to 
executive directors and employees. This section contains a detailed discussion of these 
three areas. 
2.3.1 The Agency Problem 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) first presented a formal treatment of the agency problem. 
They addressed agency problems in the context of a firm that is viewed as a hub of many 
contracts with its stakeholders. Incentive conflicts arise in these contractual 
relationships as the parties pursue their own self-interest. Jensen and Meckling 
demonstrated that an owner-manager who retains complete control of the fIrm and 
finances through the issuance of shares or debt to outsiders produces costs for the firm. 
These costs arise when management's desire to benefit from his position causes him to 
exhaust the firm's resources in excess of what is optimal, and when management invests 
in high-risk projects and in so doing transfers wealth from debt-providers to 
shareholders. 
Hall (1998) examined the existence of the agency problem in South Africa by sending 
questionnaires to the firms listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. The questions posed 
aimed to determine the goals that management of companies pursue. Hall found that a 
significant number of companies pursue goals which cannot be reconciled with an 
increase in shareholder wealth, and concluded that an agency problem does exist in South 
Africa. Furthermore, he found that the occurrence of share option and bonus schemes 
is very high and stated that it appeared to be one of the most popular methods of 
circumventing the agency problem. 
Haugen and Senbet (1981) and Hemmer (1993) found that executive compensation that 











Senbet demonstrated that if the owner-manager takes positions in call and put options" 
to purchase and/ or sell the finn respectively at a specific price, the options substantially 
alleviate the agency problem that exists between managers and external capital 
contributors. Their use of call options is equivalent to the use of executive share 
options in executive compensation, and the put options represent convertible debentures 
retained by external financiers. 
Haugen and Sen bet solved for the exercise prices for call and put options whilst 
controlling for agency costs, such as the fact that the manager cannot consume resources 
in excess of what is optimal, and that the total wealth of the manager including receipts 
from outsiders must total to finn value. Furthermore, they ensured that no incentive 
exists for the manager to avoid value-creating projects in preference for high variance 
investment opportunities, nor in preference for low but suboptimal investments. By 
assuming the options were European with a single period to expiration, Haugen and 
Sen bet were able to solve for the exercise price of both call and put options whilst 
maintaining zero agency costs. Finns therefore use share options to align executive 
directors' interests with shareholders, and convertible debentures to align executive 
directors' interests with debt providers (Haugen & Senbet 1981). 
Hall and Liebman (1998) also found that share options diminish agency costs when they 
used the Black-Scholes method of option valuation to assess the correlation between 
CEO compensation and market valuations for 478 large United States finns during the 
1980's and 1990's. They found that shares and options as a form of compensation 
provided a much stronger link to shareholder value than traditional salaries and annual 
bonuses did The results showed that 98% of the link between total pay and 
performance is attributable to changes in the value of share and share option holdings, 
and that only 2% comes from salary and bonus changes. This provides further evidence 
that share options align management and shareholders' incentives. 
2.3.2 Financial Reporting Issues 
2.3.2.1 Background: Accounting for Share Options 
Although the use of share-based compensation has increased, there is currently neither a 
South African nor an Intemational Accounting Standard that deals with the accounting 











for these payments. Consequently, companies are not recognising any charge to the 
income statement to reflect this payment. Ine well-known American investor Warren 
Buffet aptly summed up the situation in 1998 when he wrote: "Accounting principles 
offer management a choice: pay employees in one form and count the cost, or pay them 
in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder the use of options has 
mushroomed" (Cohen 2001b). 
The impact of the lack of an accounting statement was clearly shown in research 
conducted by Smithers & Co in 2001 in the United Kingdom. They found that out of 
the top one hundred US companies, eleven would have had no positive net earnings if 
the cost of employee share options were accounted for as an expense. Another thirteen 
companies including Coca-Cola, Gillette and Walt Disney would have halved their profits 
had they recognised a share option expense (Hasen fuss 2001), although Coca-Cola have 
since deducted share options as an expense beginning in the founh quaner of their 2002 
financial year (Hill & Durr 2001). 
The United States (US) was the first country to attempt to implement an accounting 
statement for share-based payment. In 1993 The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(F ASB) was placed under pressure by a US Senate subcommittee to propose an 
accounting rule to reflect the value of share options to directors and employees and the 
cost to the firm. They proposed the recognition of share-based compensation as an 
expense in the income statement to the firm on granting date. This proposal was heavily 
criticised and the US Senate publicly opposed the FASB's proposal "on practical and 
technical grounds" (Internat:iond Emplo;re Stock Option Coalition 2001). The FASB 
succumbed and in 1995 produced a Financial Accounting Standard No. 123 (FAS 123) 
that gave companies the choice of reponing share options as an expense in the income 
statement or, as has been the choice of almost all US companies, as a footnote in the 
annual repon. The F ASB did however maintain that share options issued as 
compensation do have a value and that disclosure is not a sufficient mechanism to reflect 
this value (Newbury 2001). 
The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) were the next to identify the need 
for guidance on accounting for these payments, and in July 2000, the G4+ 1 issued a 
Discussion Paper on accounting for share-based payment. 'The Discussion Paper 
proposed that such payments should be recognised in the financial statements, with a 











In addition, the transaction should be measured at the fair value of the shares or options 
issued, which an option-pricing model would establish, and that the vesting date is the 
appropriate measurement date. When the other party is required to perform between 
the date of being granted the share-based payment and vesting date, an estimate of the 
transaction amount should be accrued over the performance period (IASB 2000). 
Due to the increased interest in accounting for share options, the FASB's 1993 proposal 
has recently been under scrutiny. However, the basis for their conclusions in their 
proposal does not appear to be consistent with their conceptual framework. The 
framework states that equity transactions (which includes share-based transactions) are 
always non-reciprocal7 transactions as opposed to reciprocal transactions. By proposing 
that the cost of share options be expensed in the income statement, the FASB's proposal 
applied an accounting treatment for share options that was in fact for reciprocal 
transactions. Newbury (2001) believes that share options are indeed reciprocal in nature 
as resources flow both to and from the firm when the director or employee provides a 
service and the firm remunerates him for it. It has been suggested that this 
inconsistency between their proposal and their conceptual framework will cause 
confusion and is potentially detrimental to future projects both within the United States 
and in other jurisdictions that draw from the FASB's conceptual framework. The FASB 
have begun to address this issue in their new project to reconsider the distinction 
between liabilities and equity (Newbury 2001). 
The IASB also recognised the need to classify share-based compensation transactions, 
and did so by addressing the distinction between liabilities and equity in their discussion 
paper on share-based payment. They confirmed that a share option is an equity 
instrument and stated that the issue of share options does not compel the firm to transfer 
cash or other assets to another party, and it therefore cannot meet the definition of a 
liability as embodied in the IASB conceptual framework (IASB 2000). The Discussion 
Paper therefore does not appear to contradict the IASB conceptual framework, unlike 
the situation in the US. 
A further issue that threatened the validity of the IASB conceptual framework was 
whether the recognition of an expense from share-based payment is consistent with the 
7 Non-reciprocal transactions occur when resources flow in one direction only, such as contributions 
from owners. Most transactions take the form of reciprocal transactions, which occur when resources 










definition of an expense. In April 2002, the IASB confirmed that their conclusions were 
indeed consistent with the conceptual framework, and accompanied this statement with 
comprehensive reasons. The definition of an expense as per the conceptual framework 
includes the statement that an expense is a decrease in economic benefits during the 
accounting period in the form of outflows or depletions of assets, or incurrence of 
liabilities. The IASB concluded that an 'asset' is not limited to resources that can be 
recognised on the balance sheet as such, and that personal services are momentary assets 
to the company. The consumption of these services gives rise to an expense, and there 
is therefore a depletion of assets and an expense as defined (IASB 2002a). 
The IASB's Discussion Paper has generated a large amount of interest. Over 280 
comments including submissions from the major accounting firms on the IASB's 
Discussion Paper were received. Anhur Anderson8, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), 
Deloine & Touche and KPMG all agreed that there should be recognition of these 
payments in the fmancial statements, but recommended that the fair value of the goods 
or services received and not the fair value of the shares or options granted is the 
appropriate measurement. The appropriate date was also believed to be the granting 
date and not the vesting date, and that the proposal to accrue for the payment over the 
performance period was appropriate. However PWC, Deloine & Touche and KPMG 
all recommended the use of an extensive disclosure model rather than financial statement 
recognition until such time as the complexities of this topic are resolved. The 
complexities were believed to be determining the fair value of the goods or service 
received, deciding on the date that the transaction should be measured, and the 
uncenainty regarding the definitions of liabilities and equity. PWC also stated that the 
current format of financial statements does not provide a suitable environment for the 
expensing of share options, and that a more fundamental project on reponing financial 
performance, defining what performance is and how performance should be measured 
should take first priority (G4+ 1 Letters 2001). 
Comments submined by organisations such as the International Employee Stock Option 
Coalition opposing the proposals outlined in the Discussions Paper, have also strongly 
urged the IASB towards a disclosure-based standard. Their letter to Sir David Tweedie, 
chairman of the IASB, declared that "if adopted, the approach set fonh in the G4+ 1 
Discussion Paper would create a distinct disparity between the time-tested US standard 











understood the IASB was designed to create" (International Employee Sux:k Option Coalition 
2001). 
These comments contributed towards the IASB's tentative conclusions issued in May 
2002. The IASB stated that no exemption from the proposed future standard on 
employee share purchase plans would be permitted. The Board suggested that the share 
option transaction should be measured at the fair value of goods or services received, or 
the fair value of the equity instruments issued (or to be issued), whichever is more readily 
determinable, and that a rebuttable presumption exists for transactions with employees, 
stating that the fair value of the equity instrument issued (or to be issued) is more readily 
determinable. Furthermore, the fair value should also be estimated at grant date (IASB 
2002b). The date of measurement has therefore changed from the original proposal of 
vesting date, and the basis of measurement been clarified. The proposal to recognise 
share options as an expense, has therefore generally been opposed by preparers of 
financial statements but unanimously agreed with by users of financial statements (IASB 
2002a). 
In accordance with this proposal an exposure draft ED 2: Share-based payments, has 
been issued by the IASB and an identical South African exposure draft (ED 160: Share-
based Payment) was issued thereafter. ED 2/ED 160 proposes that a share option 
expense and simultaneous increase in equity be recognised at the fair value of the options 
granted because it is presumed to be more readily determinable than the fair value of 
employee services received. ED 2/ED 160 also proposes that fair value should be 
measured at grant date, as was proposed by the IASB in their tentative conclusions issued 
in May 2002. Comments on the exposure draft were to be submitted by the 21 February 
2003. At the time of writing, the outcome of this feedback has not been made public. 
2.3.2.2 The Situation in South Africa Prior to ED 160 
In South Africa, AC116: Employee Benefits does not specify recognition or 
measurement requirements for equity compensation benefits. It does however list a 
number of disclosure requirements that include; the nature and terms of equity 
compensation plans, the accounting policy employed, any amounts recognised in the 
financial statements, the number, terms and fair value of equity financial instruments at 
the beginning and end of the period. 
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Funhennore, the number of equity instruments distributed, exercised and lapsed during 
the period should be disclosed, as well as details of options that vested and the fair value 
of any consideration received from equity compensation plans during the period (SAlCA 
2001). 
The ]SE Securities Exchange aSE) also prescribes in its listing requirements the 
minimum content to appear in the annual financial statements of listed companies. With 
regard to share incentive schemes; a summary of the details and tenns of options, the 
number of securities that may be utilised for the purposes of the scheme at the beginning 
of the accounting period, the movement during the period and the balance at the end of 
the period must be disclosed. Funhennore, an analysis in aggregate of directors' 
emoluments including any share options, their strike price and period, the period when 
and at what price options have been exercised and any other relevant infonnation is 
required. The analysis must show these disclosures separately for executive and non-
executive directors (pricewaterhouseCoopers 2000). 
These disclosure requirements are repeated in the Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct within the King Repon on Corporate Governance 1994 with which listed 
companies, banks, financial and insurance entities, as well as public sector enterprises are 
required to comply (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 1994). 
The Second King Repon on Corporate Governance (King II) was published in March 
2002, and requires increased detail with regard to remuneration. It stated that 
perfonnance-related elements should constitute a substantial ponion of the total 
remuneration package of executives and that full disclosure of director remuneration on 
an individual basis, including details of restraint payments, all share schemes and other 
incentive schemes, should be provided (Institute of Directors in Southem Africa 2002). 
King II differs to the original King Repon in that it permits the granting of share options 
to non-executive directors, subject to prior shareholder approval and the requirements of 
the Companies Act, and suggests an appropriate vesting period for these options. 
However, it does state that the intemational view is that non-executive directors should 
preferably receive shares rather than share options to avoid the dilution of independence. 
King II also provides guidance on the re-pricing of share options, requiring details and 











options that are issued at a discount also require specific shareholder approval (Institute 
of Directors in Southern Africa 2002). 
Thus significantly more disclosure in the Annual Report and additional corporate 
governance with respect to remuneration procedures can be anticipated in the interim 
before ED 2/ED 160 becomes applicable. This will enable shareholders to more 
thoroughly assess and monitor whether the interests of the directors are in line with their 
own. 
2.3.3 Taxation Issues 
2.3.3.1 Taxation from the Finn's Perspective 
Share options are not considered to be expenditure for tax purposes, thus no deduction 
is permitted for the firm when share options are granted. The South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) views share options, not as a cost to the firm, but merely a dilution of the 
other shareholders' holdings, and therefore the costs do not fall under the general 
deduction section 11 (a) (Huxham 2002). W'hen the IASB releases a standard on 
accounting for share-based payment that states this form of payment to be an expense 
(as previously discussed), SARS may change their stance and the Legislature may amend 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 to include some form of tax deduction for the firm. 
2.3.3.2 Taxation from the Employee's Perspective 
From the employee's perspective, sSA of the South African Income Tax Act includes in 
taxable income any gain made by the exercise, cession, or release of a share option. This 
section applies to directors, former directors and employees. The amount included in 
taxable income is equal to the difference between the amount paid for the shares and the 
market value at that date, less any amount paid for the options. If the taxpayer has a 
restriction placed on his right to dispose of the shares for a specified period, then the s8A 
gain is deferred until the period has passed. S8A(6) also contains an anti-avoidance 
provision that prevents the original holder of the share option from avoiding tax if the 
gain is made by any other person (Huxham & Haupt 2002). 
Capital Gains Tax (CGT) was introduced in South Africa with effect from 1 October 
2001, and has implications for share options. Many of the complex issues surrounding 
CGT including some relating to share options are as of yet unresolved, and will hopefully 











disregards any capital gain or loss made on the exercise of an option, the reason being 
that the amount paid for the option will be allowed as part of the base cost of the share 
acquired in terms of the option. The base cost of the share forms part of the capital 
gain calculation when the shares are sold (Huxham & Haupt 2002). If the option was 
acquired before 1 October 2001, the valuation of the option at this date will be treated as 
part of the base cost of the share. If the option was acquired after this date, the 
expenditure incurred in acquiring the option is part of the taxpayer's base cost. 
Furthermore, paragraph 18(1) states that if the person entitled to exercise the option 
does not do so, any capital loss he may sustain is disregarded (Meyerowitz 2001). 
However paragraph 18(2) states that paragraph 18(1) does not apply when the option is 
to acquire a financial instrument, which a share is. Thus it appears that holders of share 
options may cany forward any capital loss incurred on the non-exercise of the options. 
2.4 Previous Studies 
A number of previous studies have been conducted on share options. 'Ibese studies 
have identified three main possibilities as to why companies grant share options. The 
first possibility (reason) is that companies grant share options to reduce the costs of 
agency between management and shareholders. These studies used proxies for agency 
costs to determine the relationship between the use of share options and the costs of 
agency. The second reason is the finding that the use of share options can have 
favourable accounting implications due to the fact that no expense need be recognised. 
A number of variables were identified to represent the companies accounting 
performance in these studies. The third reason for the granting of share options has 
been related to the companies tax position, and proxies for this were also identified in 
previous research. 
This section continues with a detailed discussion of these three reasons and the variables 
that were previously identified as proxies for these reasons. 
2.4.1 Proxies for Agency Costs 
As discussed above, the use of share option schemes has been found to reduce the 
problem of agency, by aligning shareholder and management goals. Extensive research 
has been done to identify variables that can be used as proxies for agency costs, that are 












2.4.1.1 The Variance of Share Returns 
Lewellen, Loderer and Manin (1987) conducted research on the proportion of share-
related and cash-based components of executive remuneration. >-Ibey hypothesised that 
a major motivation for the different components of executive remuneration is to reduce 
the conflicts of interest between owners and managers due to differences in time-
horizons and risk exposure. They argued that because the shareholders' time horizon is 
in principle unlimited since all future residual cash flows that the finn is expected to 
generate will be impounded into the share price, managers need to be given an explicit 
claim on those future cash flows. This is necessary to encourage management to give 
proper attention to decisions that will favourably affect them and to align their time 
horizon with that of the shareholders. However, a concern was raised that although a 
share of the finn's future cash flows would reduce the limited time-horizon problem of 
managers, it would simultaneously increase their risk exposure as a result of a greater 
proportion of their wealth being connected to the future financial well-being of the finn. 
It was argued that managers may therefore stan to make decisions that reduce finn risk 
and in so doing diminish shareholder wealth. Thus the point was made that the solution 
to either the difference in time-horizons or risk exposure may intensify the problem of 
the other. 
With this concern in mind, Lewellen et al (1987) examined the manner in which the 
circumstances of the individual finns determine the composition of their senior executive 
compensation packages. One of the hypotheses that they tested was whether the 
proportion of total pay that consists of share-based payment was associated with the 
variance of finn's share return. They argued that share-based compensation could assist 
in aligning managerial and shareholder interests, by increasing the cost to managers of 
investments that decrease share prices, and raising the payoff to them from variance-
increasing investments if the finn is levered. Hence, the variance of share returns was 
included. 
The results showed a significant positive relationship between the proportion of total pay 
consisting of share-based payment and the variance of the finn's share returns. Lewellen 
et ai's (1987) original concern that managers may in fact avoid variance-increasing 
investments due the consequential increase of their personal risk exposure therefore did 











These results were consistent with Smith and Watts' (1992) and Gaver and Gaver's 
(1993) later findings. 
2.4.1.2 Long-tenn Investment Opportunities and Growth 
When determining the different components of management compensation, the extent 
of the finn's long-term investment opportunities may influence this decision. Lewellen 
et at (1987) also tested whether the proportion of share-based compensation was 
associated with the proportion of firm's investment opportunities that are long~term in 
nature. Two variables were included as proxies for these investment opportunities: the 
book value of the long~term assets divided by the book value of total assets which 
measured the importance of current projects with a long useful life; and secondly the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity to assess the relative 
importance of options on future profitable investment opportunities. The second 
variable was necessary because the finn's market-to-book ratio reflects the rate at which 
earnings and cash flows would be expected to grow over time, given the volume of 
. . . 
mvestment opporturutles. 
The results showed a significant positive relationship between the proportion of total pay 
consisting of share-based payment and the proportion of a finn's investment 
opportunities that are long-term in nature. 
In a similar study, Gaver and Gaver (1993) found that growth finns (defined in that study 
by the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditure to the book value of assets) 
are more likely to use share option plans as opposed to non-growth finns. The logic for 
this variable's inclusion is that the higher the expenditure on R&D, the greater the 
investment made by the firm in creating new products and potential barriers to entry, and 
the greater the pursuit of long term earnings which would align shareholders and 
managements goals. A disadvantage to using this variable was stated to be that it 
represents only one example of many available types of discretionary expenditures that 
support growth, and is thus not suitable in all industries. However, Baber, Janakiraman 
and Kang (1996); Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1996); Douglas, Scott, Boyle and 
Zhang (1997) and Klassen and Mawani (2000) also identified this variable as a proxy for 
the firm's investment opportunities. 
Other variables that were included by Gaver and Gaver (1993) were the earnings yield of 











By including a variable for the frequency that a finn is included in growth-mutual funds, 
Gaver and Gaver stated that a bias towards larger firms is introduced. TIlls is because 
the transaction costs associated with the investment for extremely small finns (including 
filing requirements if the fund obtains a material interest in the finn) exceed the expected 
benefits. 
These findings of Lewellen et al (1987) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) showed that finn's 
with long-term investment and growth opportunities are more likely to grant share 
options and were consistent with those of Lamben and Larcker (1987), Smith and Watts 
(1992), and KJassen and Mawani (2000). However, they were inconsistent with Yem1ack 
(1995) and Bizjak , Brickley and Coles (1993) whose findings showed a sigrilficant 
negative association between option granting and growth opponunities. Yermack 
justified his finding by relating the result to the method that he used to measure the 
dependent variable which differed to all the other studies, namely, the sensitIvity of CEO 
wealth to changes on the firm value. Bizjak et al (1993) could not provide an intuitive 
economic interpretation of his result. Funher inconsistent findings were identified by 
Matsunaga (1995), who did not find a significant relationship between the extent of 
research and development expenditure and option granting, although he did fmd the 
market-to-book ratio to be significantly associated with option granting. Matsunaga did 
not provide any reasons for his contradictory results. 
2.4.1.3 The Executive's Age 
Lewellen et at's (1987) study also tested the association between the age of the executive 
and the composition of compensation. Their reasons for including the age variable were 
that they hypothesised that the YOUJlger the executive, the longer his prospective 
employment period with the firm, and the less likely it shOlJd be that his investment 
decisions on behalf of the firm would be in his own self-interest. That is, younger 
executives will be more prepared to spend on research and development because they 
will pOtentially stilJ be at the firm in the long-term to enjoy the benefits of that 
expenditure. Thus conllicts of interest are not expected to be as apparent between 
young executives and the firm as between older executives and the finn. Younger 
executives were also considered to be less wealthy than older executives and less willing 
to accept additional risk exposure from long-term forms of compensation. Lewellen ez 
al (1987) therefore expected a positive correlation between the proponion of share-based 
compensation and age, to reduce the differences in time-horizons, and indeed found a 










based compensation. However, Yermack (1995) and Eaton and Rosen (1983) did not 
find executives to be significantly correlated with option granting. There are 
therefore conflicting findings as to whether the executive's age is significantly associated 
with option granting. 
2.4.1.4 The Debt-Equity Ratio 
The association between the debt-equity ratio and the composition of executive 
compensation has also been examined. The logic behind the use of a debt-equity ntio is 
that when this ratio is large, shareholders may prefer executives to be compensated by 
non-cash means, so as to preserve the cash to meet debt commitments. Lewellen et at 
(1987) found this variable to be significantly positively related to the proponion of pay 
that consists of share-based payment. This result was supponed by Klassen and Mawani 
(2000). 
However, Yermack (1995) argued that if managers have strong incentives to maximise 
the value of equity, debt holders would demand a higher risk premium for supplying 
capital because they will fear that management will pursue overly risky investment 
projects that transfer wealth from debt holders to equity holders. He therefore 
anticipated a negative relationship between financial leverage and share option granting, 
although his results did not confirm this. Matsunaga (1995) also did not find a 
significant relationship between these variables. 
2.4.1.S The Finn's Beta 
The beta of the firm (which is a measure of the firm's systematIC risk relative to the 
market) was also included by Lewellen et at (1987) in their research to explain the reasons 
for the different proportions of share-based compensation to cash compensation. They 
stated that share-based payments link executive compensation to general movements in 
share prices, which executives GUillot COntrol. ~The more sensitive the firm's share price 
is to market-wide movements the weaker the association between the benefits of 
including share options as managerial compensation and the performance of the firm 
that management is incentivised to improve upon. 
A significant negative relationship was found in his srudy between the proportion of tolal 











2.4.1.6 The Use of Earnings Perfonnance Measures 
Sloan (1991) hy-pothesised that compensation contracts that are based on earnings 
performance measures in addition to share performance help shield executive 
compensation from market-wide fluctuations in equity values. Fama (1976) showed that 
approximately one third of the variation in share price related to market-wide 
flucruations in share price, which supported the theory that market-wide movements are 
a major source of noise in firms' share prices. 
Sloan expected eammgs to be more sensitive to firm-specific value changes (which are 
typically as a resuJr of changes in cash flows) than to market-wide value changes because 
accounting principles do not incorporate the market-wide flucruations in discount rates 
on the value of future cash flows, which is a major source of market-wide changes in 
value. The amount of noise in share returns was calculated as an increasing function of 
the proportion of the variation in share returns that is related to market-wide movements 
in share returns. 
Sloan expected that firms with a high amount of noise in share returns relative to market 
returns are more likely to use earnings performance measures in compensation contracts. 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) (see 2.4.1.7 below) showed that these performance measures 
are more likely to be used when the noise in earnings is high relative to the noise in share 
price which was found to be significantly positively associated with the proportion of 
executive share-based compensation. Based on Lambert and Larcker's (1987) resuJts, 
Sloan predicted and found that the nOlse in share price attributable to the market was 
positively associated with the use of share-based forms of executive compensation. 
This variable has therefore been found to influence the decision to grant opoons. 
2.4.1.7 Monitoring Difficulty 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) examined the usage of accounting returns versus market 
returns as performance measures in determming CEO's compensation. They defined 
market returns as the sum of the firm's capital gams and dividends divided by the share 
price at the begmning of the year, and accounting returns were measured by the firm's 
return on equity. Lambert and Larcker found that the degree to which compensation is 
related to market returns versus accounting returns is positively related to the inverse of 
the degree of noise in these two performance measures. Stated differently, the relative 
weight placed on a performance measure in a compensation contraCt is an increasing 











This occurs when remuneration commmees have difficulty obtaining clear signals of the 
quahty of manager's decisions. In these situations, the committees cannot make reliable 
decisions about revising executive's cash salaries and bonuses and thus share-based 
compensation offers an alternative to salary reVIsions based on direct monitoring. 
Therefore when the noise in earnings is high relative to the noise in share price, the 
quahty of manger's decisions are not apparent, more emphasis is placed on share-based 
compensation as opposed to cash-based compensation. This theory was supported by 
the results of Eaton and Rosen (1993) and Lewellen et a1 (1987). It was however not 
supported by Mehran (1995), Yermack (1995) and Matsunaga (1995), although this was 
possibly due to the dissimilar measurement basis used to calculate this variable. For 
example, Matsunaga (1995) incorporated both the risk premium demanded by the 
executive and the cost of monitoring management when calculating this variable. 
2.4.1.8 Industry 
Smith and Watts (1992) and Ely (1991) suggested that the structure of compensation 
packages differ across industries. Ely (1991) assumed that firms in the same industry 
face similar production environments, and hypothesised that if executive compensation is 
related to firm performance then differences in the production environment should 
cause inter-firm differences in the relation between executive compensation and 
performance. Indeed significant inter-industry differences were foulld between 
executive compensation and performance. By analysing the results per industry, any 
differences between industries can be disregarded. Matsunaga (1995), Yermack (1995) 
and KJassen and Mawani (2000) used industry dummy variables to capture differences in 
agency costS across the sampJe of firms. Both the studies conducted by Yermack and 
Klassen and Mawani revealed that the industry classification influenced the firm's 
decision to grant options or not. 
2.4.1.9 Fraction of Equity Owned by Executives 
Yennack (1995) also examined whether the decision to grant share options is significandy 
associated with the fraction of the firm's equity currently owned by the executive. He 
included this variable due to the theory that low levels of executive share ownership are a 
major source of agency problems, which has consequently led to the argument that 
executive compensation contracts should take into account the executive's personal share 
ownership. Yermack predjcted that executive's that do not hold a large proportion of 











a significant relationship between the two variables, and neither did Matsunaga (1995). 
Mehran (1995) on the other hand found a significant negative relationship between the 
proportion of the firm's share capital owned by the executive and share options granted 
to such executive. A reason suggested by Mehran for his finding was that remuneration 
committees consider the executive's total incentives rather than only equity-based 
incentives when they design executive pay packages. "nus was the only significant result 
with regard to this variable. 
2.4.1.10 Share Retum 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) hypothesised that public and private political forces impose 
constraints that reduce the association between executive pay and performance levels. 
Indeed they found a rather small relationship between executive wealth and shareholder 
wealth. They did however find that the largest (although still small) perfoImance 
incentive came from ownership of the firm's shares, and thus a significant positive 
relationship was found to exist between the firm's share returns and the use of share 
options as a form of compensation. 
2.4.2 Proxies for Financial Reporting Implications 
Three major studies have been conducted in the United States and Canada on the 
relationship between financial reporting incentives and option granting behaviour. The 
following variables were identified as proxies for the firm's financial reporting siruation. 
2.4.2.1 Interest Cover 
In the United States, Yennack (1995) tested many hypotheses relating to share 
options, one of which was whether the mix of compensation between share options 
and cash salary for Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) can be explained by the finn's 
financial reporting management Yennack's rationale for the study was that prior 
research had generally focused on a smaller number of hypotheses and had treated 
share options as a smaller part of a broader research area. At the time of his study, 
few conclusions regarding whether finns grant share options in accordance with their 
financial reporting situatIOn had been made. 
Yermack contributed a new measure for the mix of compensation between share 
options and cash salary that approximated the change in executives' wealth in relation 











between 1984 and 1991, and his proxy for financial reporting management (interest 
cover) was based on work done by Matsunaga, Shevlin and Shores (1992). His logic 
for using this variable was that finns with low interest cover might have .low 
profitability and a high risk of violating debt covenants. The results however showed 
that the proxy for financial reporting management was not found to Influence the mix 
of compensation. No reasons for this finding were provided. 
2.4.2.2 Deviation from Target Net Income and the use of Income-Increasing 
Accounting Methods 
A further study was done in 1995 in the United States when Matsunaga examined the 
financial reporting effects of granting share options in the US, as the literature had been 
sparse in this regard. Mats1.maga regressed the value of employee share options? on test 
variables that reflect the finn's financial reporting benefits. lie also tested whether the 
value of share options was associated with the finn's employment of income-increasmg 
accounting strategies, based on work done by Press and Weintrop (1990) and Zmijewski 
and Hagerman (1981). The income increasing (decreasing) choices were shown to be (a) 
FIFO (LIFO), (b) straight-line (accelerated) depreciation, (c) an amortisation period of 
past service costs greater than or equal to 30 years Oess than 30 years), and (d) accounting 
for the investment tax credit using the flow-through (deferral) method lO • 
With regard to the financial reporting effects of granting share options, Matsunaga 
assumed that implicit or explicit costs arise (financial reporting costs) from reporting net 
meome below a target leveL These costs could either be as a reswt of violating debt 
covenants based on the attaimnent of accounting perfonnance measures, or implicit 
costs as a result of shareholder dissatisfaction. 11lls target was assumed to follow a 
random walk with a drift if the estimated drift was positive arId a random walk without a 
drift if the estimated drift was negative. The drift was estimated as the average change in 
income before extraordinary items over a five-year period. Matsunaga hypothesised that 
firms below their target level of income wil] substitute options for other forms of 
compensation to boost their reported income as no expense need be recognised. He 
therefore anticipated a negative correlation between the value of share options granted 
and the deviation from target income. When firms exceed their target level of income, 
Matsunaga hypothesised that the value of share options granted could be either 
negatively or positively correlated with the deviation from target income: it would be 











negative if directors adjust their use of share options to smooth reported income, and 
positive if the use of options ref]ects a reward for performance. 
Data from 123 finns from 1979 to 1989 was examined. The results were that the vallle 
of options granted was significantly negatively related to the extent the firm is below its 
target level of income. Firms reporting poor earnings and therefore facing greater 
financial reponing costs were more likely to issue share options to executives. No 
association between options granted and earnings above the finns target Jevel was found. 
The proportion of income-increasing accounting methods used by the firm was also 
found to be significantly positively correlated with the value of options granted. 
2.4.2.3 Deviation from Target Retum on Equity 
In Canada, Klaasen and Mawani (2000) explored the effects of financial reporting 
incentives on options granted to Canadian Chief Executive Officers. Option granting 
behaviour was measured as the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of share options granted 
to the swn of this value and cash compensation. The option ratio was regressed on a 
number of financial reporting and tax variables while controlling for agency costs, 
liquidity, profitability and size which he reduced to two factors. Data from 184 firms 
granting options and 143 firms not granting options from 1993-1995 was examined. 
Contrary to the findings of Yermack (1995) and consistent with Matsunaga (1995), the 
results suggest that the lack of the need to recognise a share option expense influences 
the decisIOn to grant share options, particularly when firms are below their target 
earnings. The calculation of the deviation from target earnings was similar to that used 
by Matsunaga, except that it was a deviation of return on equity rather than a deviation of 
earnings, and the drift was calculated using a geometrically declining weighted average of 
the change in return on equity over the previous five years. 
There is therefore some evidence that firms that have earnings below their target profit 
level or implement income-mcreasing accounting policies are more likely to issue share 
options so as to avoid recognising an expense and funher reducing profit. 











2.4.3 Proxies for Tax Status 
The studies conducted in Canada and the United States also examined the tax effects of 
share option grants. However from snJdies emerged conflicting results. One 
reason for this is that the US studies examined grants consisting mainly of nonqualified 
options (NQO'st that are deductible for the firm at the date of exercise. In Canada 
however, no deduction is pennitted for share options granted, as is the case in South 
Africa. Thus South African and Canadian firms both experience tax disincentives in that 
no deduction is obtained when granting share options, whereas US firms obtain tax 
benefits by claiming a deduction for the share options granted. Conflicting results are 
therefore to be expected. 
2.4.3.1 Assessed Losses Carried Forward 
With regard to the mix of compensation, Yermack (1995) also tested the hypothesis that 
a greater fraction of CEO compensation should be in the form of share options when 
finns have assessed losses carried forward The reason for this is that firms that have 
tax losses carried forward are more likely to obtain the least benefit from tax deductions 
for cash compensation, and may therefore be more willing to grant options instead of 
cash. The result however was that tax poslt1on was not found to influence the mix of 
compensation, possibly due to the fact that both cash and NQO's are deductible in the 
US. 
2.4.3.2 The Finn's Estimated Future Marginal Tax Rate 
Matsunaga's (1995) study differed to Yermack in that he mcluded both nonqualified 
stOck options granted in his sample, together with incentive share options granted 
(ISO's). ISO's were created in 1981 and differ to NQO's in that the firm cannot obtain 
a tax deduction. Matsunaga measured tax status as a linear function of the firm's 
estimated future marginal tax rate. This variable was based on a study by Shevlin (1990) 
who used a simuJation to estimate the present value of the change in taxes payable for an 
additional dollar of Income earned in the current year. He did not however find an 
association between options granted and the size of the tax disincentive relating to ISO's. 
No reasons were given as to why the aSSOClation between the firm's estimated future 
marginal tax rate and value of share options granted was not statistically significant. 
II Finns that Issue non-qualified options will obtain a deduction at exercise dale equal to the difference 
between the market value at exercise date less the exercise pnce, and will be taxed at the marginal tax 











Thus neither Yermack nor Matsunaga found option granting behaviour to be intluenced 
by tax position. 
2.4.3.3 Assessed Losses Carried Forward and the Sign of Taxable Income 
KJassen and Mawani (2000) did find the tax position of the firm to be significantly 
associated with option granting behavior, contrary to the findings of both Yermack 
(1995) and Matsunaga (1995). Finns were considered to have a high marginal tax rate if 
they had positive taxable income and no assessed losses carried forward. If they had 
positive taxable income and assessed losses carried forward or negative taxable income 
but no assessed losses carried forward, they were considered to have moderate marginal 
tax rates. If they had both negative taxable income and assessed losses carried forward, 
they were considered firms with Jow marginal tax rates. The reason for these results 
confUcting with those of Yermack was that Canadian firms are never permitted to deduct 
the cost of share options whereas US firms can deduct the cost of their NQO's. It 
remains unclear why Matsunaga did not obtain statistically significant associations 
between the value of ISO options granted and tax position. 
2.4.4 Other Control Variables 
Apart from financial reporting, tax and agency reasons, cash flow and firm size may also 
influence the granting of share options to executive directors. 
2.4.4.1 Firm Size 
Ceteris paribus, larger firms are likely to have greater sophistIcation in executive 
compensation and are therefore more likely to grant options (KJassen and Mawani 
(2000)). Smith and Watts (1992) suggested that the fixed cOStS and scale economies in 
the administration of share incentive plans are large, and such plans should therefore be 
observed more frequently in the large firms. Yermack (1997) and KJassen and Mawani 
(2000) used the logarithm of the market value of the firm's equity as a proxy for Size and 
found that the firm's size is significantly positively related to the decision to grant 
options. Size was also found to be a significant variable by Gaver and Gaver (1993); 
Matsunaga (1995); Sm.ith and Watts (1992) and Klassen and Mawani (2000). An unusual 
result was that of Murphy (1985) who found a significant negative relationship between 
firm size and option granting. Murphy agreed that his result was unexpected and could 










Mehran (1995) did not find a significant relationship between these two variables. 
Mehran (1995) suggested that this was possibly due to the calruJation of his proxy for 
finn size, namely Tobin's Q12. 
2.4.4.2 Liquidity 
Yermack (1995) identified companies facing liquidity constraints by using a dummy 
variable equal to one if a finn pays zero dividends during the year, and found that firms 
with current cash flow problems use share options to a greater degree than firms with 
sufficient cash in hand. This is due to the fact that share options do not require a cash 
payment by the firm. Klassen and Mawani (2000) used operating cash flow divided by 
the book value of eqwty as a measure of liquidity, and expected it to be significantly 
negatively correlated with the proportion of share options gramecL although his results 
did not confirm this. Matsunaga (1995) used the opening balance of net current assets 
divided by the opening balance of total assets as a measure of liquidity, but did not find a 
significant relationship between liquidity and option granting. It is therefore uncertain 
whether option granting is driven by the firm's liquidity situation. 
2.4.5 South African Studies 
Modise (1993) published what appears to be the only study on executive remuneration in 
South AJrica. He investigated the relationship between directors' compensation and the 
performance of their companies measured by abnonnal shareholder returns13• He found 
a small, positive correlatIon between the two data sets. However, any increases m share 
options held by directors were excluded from the calculation of executive remuneration 
due to the poor quality of disclosure of JSE-listed companies at the time. 'Therefore, his 
conclusIOns do not shed any light on what the likely impact of South African companies 
that attain eammgs above or below their targets wilJ be on the proportion of share 
options granted to executive directors. 
2.4.6 Summary of Previous Research 
Tbe following table contains a summary of the variables that have been found to be 
significantly associated with option granting by previous researches. 
12 Tobin's Q was calculated as the market value of the fum divided by the replacement cost of tangible 
assets. 












Table 2A Significant Variables 
VARIABLE TESTED 
SHAREI I WITORING EXECUTIVE'S VARIANCE OF SHARE 
AUfHOR FIRM SIZE I DIFFICULTY AGE RETURN RETURN I 
Eaton & Rosen (1983) 0 POSITNE 0 
iMurphy (1985) NEGATIVE 0 
Lewellen etal (1987) YU:,ll JVE POSITNE POSITIVE 
IT ensen & MW;hy 
~92ITIVE I i(1990) 
[Smith & Warts (1992) POSITIVE I I POSITIVE 
!Gaver & Gaver (1993) POSITIVE • POSITIVE 
iBizjak et al (1993) 




IYennack (1995) 0:Fa ,Klassen and Mawaru 
l-'USIINE' 1(2000) POSITIVE POSITNE* . 
I:amben and Larcker 
(1987) POSITNE 
~ushrnan et al (1996) 
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A significant positive relationship was found 
A significant negative relationship was found 
The variable was tested but no relationship was found 
The variable was significant, but in no particular direction 
The variable was included as a part of a factor, and factor analysis was 
conducted with the indicated result. 
Share options have become an increasingly popular form of compensating directors and 
employees. Not only have share options been shown to reduce the agency costs 
prevalent within firms, they also offer financial reporting benefits due to the fact that no 
expense is required to be recognised in the income statement. Firms, however, cannot 
obtain a deduction when OptIons are granted so although there are benefits in the form 
of reduced agency costs and the avoidance of a profit impact, there is a disincentive to 
grant options from a tax perspective. 
Share options are one of many forms of share-based compensation and have produced 
both positive and negative publicity within South Africa. For some employees, share 
options have been a successful source of wealth-creation. Other reports reveal that 
many share options have become worthless as a result of falling share prices. Re-pricing 
of share options has occurred to the benefit of directors but not shareholders; and 
directors have made large gains on the exercise of options prior to the company losing 
tremendous value. Thus, share option schemes have not always succeeded in aligning 
shareholder and management goals. Consequently, many schemes have recently been 
restruc.'lured to promote the retention of staff, focussing on long-term performance, and 
have become aligned with the core strategy of the firm. 
TIle need for an accounting standard for the recognition of share-based payment was 
first pursued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States 
in 1993 and resulted in tremendous upheaval. Consequently, a consensus was reached 
that a disclosure-based standard was sufficient. In 2000, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (LASB) having also embarked on developing a stmdard for share-based 
payment issued a Discussion Paper on this topic. They proposed that the transactlon 
should be measured at the fair value of the options issued at vesting date, and that the 
expense must be accrued if performance IS required between granting and vesting date. 










many preparers thereof remained opposed to the lASB's proposals and reinforced the 
adequacy of a disclosure-based standard. Following from the Discussion Paper, an 
exposure draft (ED 160) that proposes the expensing of share options at the fair vaJue of 
the options issued at grant date has recently been released in South Africa. 
The use of share option schemes has been found to reduce the problem of agency, by 
aligning shareholder and management goals. Lewellen et al (1987) proposed that share-
based compensation could assist in this alignment by raising the reward to executives 
from variance-increasing investments. A positive relationship between the variance of 
share returns and the proportion of share-based compensation was found. Lewellen el at 
(1987) also proposed and found that the proportion of the firm's long-term investment 
opportunities were positively associated with the proportion of share-based 
compensatIon. Gaver arld Gaver (1993) found that growth firms as are also more hl;ely 
to use share option plans as opposed to non-growth firms. 
Younger executives were considered to be Jess wealthy than older executives and less 
willing to accept additional risk exposure from long-term forms of compensation. 
Lewellen etal (1987) therefore predicted and found a positive correlation between the 
proportion of share-based compensation and age. The debt-equity ratio was also 
examined because firms with large debt may prefer executives to be compensated by 
non-cash means, so as to preserve the cash to meet debt commitments. This variable 
was significantly positively related to the proportion of pay that consists of share-based 
payment. 
A significant negative relationship was found to exist between the proportion of total pay 
that consisted of share-based payment and the beta of firm. Compensation packages 
were also found to differ across industries, and many authors used industry dummy 
variables to capture differences in agency costs across the sample of firms. 
Sloan (1991) found that firms with a high amount of noise in share returns relative to 
market returns are more likely to use eamings performance measures when determining 
compensation. It was also discovered that these measures are more likely to be used hy 
firms with executives who hold share-based forms of compensation. Furthermore 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) found that when the quality of manager's decisions do nOt 











relative to the noise in share price, remuneration committees can use share-based 
compensation as an alternative to revising executives' salaries. 
Previous studies conducted on the financial reponing and tax affects of share option 
grants h ave been conducted in the U ruted States by Yermack (1995) and Matsunaga 
(!995) and in Canada by Klassen and Mawani (2000). Yermack fowld that neither the 
firm's tax position nor its financial reponing position were significantly associated with 
options that are granted to executive directors. However, Matsunaga found that firms 
that attained earnings below their target level were more likely to grant options to 
executive directors. Consistent with the results of Yermack, Matsunaga found no 
significant association between the value of executive directors' share options and the 
firm's tax status. KJassen and Mawani obtained similar results to Matsunaga regarding 
financial reponing costs, and in addition found tax status to be significantly correlated 
witb option granting behaviour. Thus conflicting results have been achieved and no 
research into the South African situation has been conducted thus far. 
Apart from financial reponing, tax and agency reasons, cash flow and firm size may also 
influence the decision to grant share opnons to executive directors. Size was found to 
be a significant variable because larger firms are likely to have greater sophistication in 
executive compensation. Yermack (1995) found that firms with current cash flow 
problems use share options to a greater degree than firms with sufficient cash in hand, 















The objective of this chapter is to discuss the research methodology employed to achieve 
the objective of the study as detailed in Chapter 1. The objective may be summarised as 
whether or not share options granted to executive directors are explained by (i.e. 
significantly associated with) determined variables relating to agency costs and the firm's 
financial and tax situation. 
~Ibis chapter contains a discussion on the sample selection process, an overview and a 
detailed description of the choice of variables used in this study (including a section that 
discusses a review of the manner in which the data was collected). The statistical 
procedure used to determine which of these variables are significantly associated with 
opoon granting is then addressed. Finally the limitations of the study are discussed. 
The initial sample consisted of the top one hundred South African companies as 
detemuned by their market capitalisation on the JSE Securities Exchange on the 31 
October 2001. A list of these companies can be found in Appendix A. The financial 
statements of these companies for the financial years ending 2000 and 2001 were 
scrutinised for evidence of the existence of a share option scheme. This information 
was often contained within the Directors' Repon, but was occasionally found within the 
share capital note to the financial statements or within a separate appendix. Where such 
evidence was found, the disclosure was examined to ascertain whether all of the variables 
required to calculate the Black-Scholes value of the share options granted to executive 
directors were provided. Companies with all the necessary information were included in 
the 'granted' sample, and the companies whose financial statements failed to provide a]] 
the necessary information were excluded from the sample. 
TIle number of options granted dw-ing the year to executive directors was a key variable 











options granted to other employees, and was therefore not separately identifiable. Some 
companies confirmed the existence of a share option scheme but provided either limited 
or no detail regarcling how many options were granted during the year or omlned the 
strike price1 of the options. A further problem was that details of the share optIon 
scheme were frequently grouped together with details of other schemes such as share 
purchase schemes. Under these circumstances, the companies concerned were excluded 
from the sample. 
Section 297 of the Company's Act (Strydom 1998) requires clisc10sure of the details of 
share option schemes, thus if no evidence of a share option scheme was provided it was 
assumed that such a scheme clid not exist. For the purposes of this study, such 
companies were included in the 'not granted' sample. 
Due to the lack of thorough clisclosure concerning share option schemes, the sample size 
was reduced to 19 companies that granted share options in 2001; 14 that granted share 
options in 2000; 17 companies that clid not grant share options in 2001 and 11 that clid 
not grant share options in 2000. The sample therefore comprises a total of 61 
companies over two years. A list of these companies is contamed in Appendix B. 
3.3 Overview of the Variables Selected 
For the purposes of this study, one dependent variable representmg the firm's option 
granting behaVIOur and thirteen independent variables that relate to either agency costs 
or the firm's financial or tax position were selected. This section continues with an 
outline of each of these variables. 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable (hereinafter 'the option ratio') is a proxy for the extent to which 
fiDT1'S use share options as a forn) of executive remuneration. 











3.3.1.1 The Option Ratio 
The option ratio represents proportion of the firm's executive directors total annual 
cash and share-based compensation that consists of share options that have been granted 
to them during the year. This variable is calculated as the Black-Scholes value of the 
options granted by the firm during the current year, divided by the sum of this value plus 
the cash salaries and bonuses paid by the firm during the year. The calculation of the 
option ratio follows the approach adopted by KJassen and Mawani (2000) in their study. 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
The thineen independent variables that have been selected can be categonsed into those 
relating to agency costs, financial reporting or tax position or 'other'. Six variables have 
been identified as proxies for agency costs, two variables to represent the firm's financial 
reporting sItuation, two variables relating to the firm's tax position, and two other 
variables relate to size and liquidity. Finally, a dummy variable for the firm's industry 
classification was selected. 
3.3.2.1 The Proxies for Agency Costs 
Followmg the work done by Lewellen et al (1987), Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) and KJassen and Mawani (2000), firm's that have highly variable share 
rerums tend to compensate their managers with share-based payments to align their 
interests with the shareholders. The variance of shareholder returns was therefore 
selected as a proxy for agency costs. 
Gaver and Gaver (1993), Baber et al (1996), Bushman et al (1996), Douglas etal (1997), 
and Klassen and Mawani (2000) found that growth firms are more likely to use share 
option plans as opposed to non-growth firms. For this reason, the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to the book value of assets was selected as a proxy for growth 
A further proxy for growth selected was the five-year growth in assets as used by 
Lan1bert and Larcker (1987). Lambert and Larcker also included the growth in as d 
proxy for growth, however, this measure was excluded from this study as not all the 
firms in the sample have a sales figure in their income statement, and twO proxies for 











As a resuJt of the findings of Srllith and Wans (1992) and LeweUen et al (1987), that the 
propoITIon of total pay consisting of share-based payment is significantly positively 
associated with the proponion of a finn's investment opportunities that are long-term in 
narure, the market-to-book ratio of equity was selected as a proxy for investment 
opportunities. The reason for selecting this variable is due to the fact that it reflects the 
rate at which earnings and cash flows are expected to grow over time, which is 
deterrllined by the volume of investment opportunities. Srllith and Watts (1992) used 
the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of the finn as a proxy for 
mvestment OpportunIties, however the market-to-book ratIo appears to be appropriate 
based on its prevalence and consistent resuJts in previous studies and was therefore used 
in this study. 
Finns with a high amount of noise in share returns relative to market returns are more 
likely to use earnings performance measures in compensation contracts, and these in turn 
are more likely to be used by finns with executives who hold share-based forms of 
compensation (Sloan (1991) and Lamben and Larcker (1987)). The 60-month variance 
of market-adjusted return~ to total market returns was selected as a measure for the noise 
in share price that is not attributable to the market. This measure was also used by 
Klassen and Mawani (2000). 
According to Yermack (1995), Lamben and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1991), more 
emphaSIS IS placed on share-based compensation when the noise in earnings is high 
relative to the noise in the share price. A measure for the nOIsiness of earnings relative 
to the share price was calculated as the ratio of the variance in return on equity for the 
prevIous years to the variance in daily share price for the previous five years, as used 
by Yermack (1995). Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1991) used the ratio of the 
variance in earnmgs per share to the variance in the share price. However, return on 
eqwty was considered to be the better variable as it mcorporates the entire equity on the 
balance sheet of the finn into the caJculation, as opposed to simply the number of shares. 
3.3.2.2 The Proxies for Financial Reporting Incentives 
'X'hen firms fail to meet income targets, explicit costs arise from contracts that are based 
on the finn attaining those targets, and implicit costs arise as a resuJt of shareholder 











granted, their deviation from their target income may influence the decision to grant 
OptIons or not. Therefore, the financial reporting incentive to grant options was 
calculated as the deviation from target return on equity (DROE). The DROE was used 
by KJassen and Mawani (2000), and is similar to the deviation from target net income 
used by Matsunaga (1995). 
A further variable representing financial reporting costs is the debt-equity ratio. This 
variable represents the fact that firms that substitute debt for equity are closer to 
violating contracts that are based on the attainment of low debt-equity and similar 
financial ratios, and consequently closer to incurring costs as a result of the violation. In 
addition, firms with a large proponion of debt relative to equity will probably wish to 
retain cash for the financing of debt as opposed to cash salaries. For these reasons, firms 
that have high debt components in their capital structure are expected to substitute 
options for cash to preserve reponed profits and cash. Klassen and Mawani (2000), 
Lewellen et al (1987), Yermack (1995) and Matsunaga (1995) used this variable in their 
study. 
3.3.2.3 The Proxy for Tax Position 
According to work done by Klassen and Mawani (2000), the firms' tax position might 
influence the decision to grant share options due to the fact that firm's do not obtain a 
tax deduction when share options are granted, but do obtain a deduction when cash 
salaries are paid. A measure for tax position suggested by Shevlin (1990) and Graham 
(1996) was used by Klassen and Mawani (2000) and used in this study. TlUs measure 
categorises firms into high, moderate, and low marginal tax rate brackets, depending on 
the presence of assessed losses within the firm and whether the firm has positive or 
negative taxable income. These three categories are then coded by two indicator 
vanables using binary code. 
3.3.2.4 Other Control Variables 
To determine whether or not the type of industry within which a firm operates plays any 
role on its option granting behaviour, dummy variables were allocated to each firm 
depending on its industry classification to capture industry-specific differences. This 
follows Smith and Wans (1992), Ely (1991), Matsunaga (1995), Yermack (1995) and 










Yermack (1997) and Klassen and Mawani (2000) used the firm's market value as a proxy 
for size. Gaver and Gaver (1992) used the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
book value of assets as a proxy for size, Matsunaga (1995) used the inverse of the 
opening balance of total assets and Sffilth and Watts (1992) used the log of real sales for 
unregulated industries and different measures for the four regulated industries. 
Although there are a number of possible proxies for size, the sample for this study was 
selected based on the firms' market values, and this measure appears to be an appropriate 
indication of size. 
A proxy for the firm's liquidity was selected as the variable used by Klassen and Mawani 
(2000), namely the ratio of operating cash flow to the book value of equity. Yermack's 
(1995) proxy for liquidity was based on whether dividends were declared. This variable 
was not selected due to the fact that the majority of South African firms declare 
dividends which would render this variable meaningless. The variable selected by 
Matsunaga (1995) being the ratio of net current assets to total assets, was not selected for 
this study due to fact that net current assets may include certain non-cash current 
liabilities, which may create bias in the ratio. 
3.4 The Variab1es Not Se1ected 
Other prmues identified in Chapter 2 for agency costs, the firm's beta, share return, the 
executive's age and the fraction of the firm's shares held by the executive were not 
selected as independent variables for this study. These variables have not been key nor 
found to be frequently significant in prior research. Furthermore, some of the 
information required to calculate these variables is not publicly available. For these 
reasons, the variables have been excluded from the scope of this study. 
3.5 The Variables in Detail 
Following from the overview of the variables that was presented in 3.3, this section 
continues with a detailed discussion of each variable, including how the variabJe was 











3.5.1 The Option Ratio 
3.5.1.1 Description 
The option ratio represents the proportion of the finn's executive directors total annual 
cash and share-based compensation that consists of share options that have been granted 
to them during the year. This variable is calculated as the Black-Scholes value of the 
options granted by the firm during the current year, divided by the sum of this value plus 
the cash salaries and bonuses paid by the firm during the year. This option ratio was 
used by Klassen and Mawaru (2000), and its selection was due to its ability to control for 
the level of compensation paid, by suppressing factors that might affect the aggregate 
level of compensation. For these reasons, it is also considered to be more appropriate 
than simply using the Black-Scholes value of the options granted as in Matsunaga (1995). 
By including the value of options granted in the denominator, the option ratio provides a 
measure that is less skewed than the ratio of share options granted to cash compensation 
used byYermack (1995). 
3.5.1.2 Measurement 
The dependent variable, known as the option ratio, is calculated as the Black-Scholes 
value of the options granted by the firm during the current year, divided by the sum of 
this value plus the cash salanes and bonuses paid by the fiml during the year. The Black 
-Scholes formula was developed by Black and Scholes (1973). This formula was 
originally derived for the pncing of European options2 on non-dividend paying shares, 
and may underestimate the true value of options where the holder has the right to 
exercise the option before maturity (namely American options) and where the option is 
on shares that pay dividends (Haugen 1993). Black-Scholes can however be used to 
value both American and European options (Haugen 1993). It is therefore appropriate 
for the valuing of South Nrican share options, which are American by nature. 
Since most South African companies pay dividends and the Black-Scholes model 
underestimates the value of options on shares that pay dividends, the model should be 
adjusted for this. The value of a share option will faU when a dividend is declared on 
the underlying share, as the market price of the share should fall by the value of the 
---- ... ---.... -- .... -~ 











dividend, and the option holder would not receive the dividends as he does not hold the 
shares but an option to acquire shares. The dividend yield is therefore a further variable 
in the Black-Scholes model and is defined as the dividend per share in the current year 
divided by the share price at year end (1vIerton 1973; ReilJy& Brown 1994). The 
dividend yield serves as a discount factor to the current share price, and the Black-
Scholes model adjusted for dividends is as follows: 
Where: d l [In((e (-D'1) )*S/X) + (R + O.5crj*T] / [cr*tI/2] 
v = Black-Scholes option value 
D the annualised dividend yield 
e = the constant: 2,71828182845904 
S = share price on the date of grant 
X the strike price of the optlon 
R = In(l + the risk-free rate) 
T = time to maturity 
(Equation la) 
(Equation 1 b) 
(Equation Ic) 
cr 2 = the annualised variance of daily share returns from 1996 - 2001 
N(d 1) = the cumulative normal probability of d1 
N(dj = the cumulative normal probability of d2 
:~ = multiply 
Yermack (1995) identified that the Black-Scholes formula has limitations for share 
options granted to executive directors since these directors are unable to hedge the value 
of their options in the market. However, Its prevalence in prevIous studies (Yermack 
(1995), Matsunaga (1995) and Klassen and MawanI (2000)) and the fact that the IASB 
proposed it as an appropriate measurement for calculatmg what should be expensed in 











Ihe Black-Scholes calculation includes a variable for the nsk-free rate}. Klassen and 
Mawani (2000) used the 90-day Treasury Bill rate for the month of the grant, however in 
South Africa, Bankers' Acceptances are considered to be more Equid than Treasury Bills 
as Treasury Bills were previously prescribed liquid asset requirements for penSlon funds 
and insurance companies (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 1996). TIlls study 
therefore uses the average Bankers Acceptance rate for the relevant year, as it is 
considered to be a better proxy for the risk-free rate in South Africa. 
The annuaLsed variance of daily share returns was estimated by using the daily share 
price for the preceeding five years. The natural logarithm of the share price at time t 
divided by [he share price at time t -1, and the standard deviation was calculated using the 
statistical technique used in Excel, and annuaLsed by multiplying it by the square root of 
250, which represents the number of trading days in a typical year (Reilly & Brown 1994). 
This figure was then squared to obtain the variance of daily share returns. A South 
African derivative trading firm, Cadiz, confirmed that this was an appropriate measure 
for the volatility of the share. 
The computed Black-Scholes option values and the total cash compensation values were 
combined to calculate the ratio of the option value to the sum of the option value and 
cash for each firm, using the following equation: 
(Equation 2) 
Where: OR the option ratio at time t 
V the Black-Scholes value of options granted to executIve direaors at 
tm1e t 
C the total of cash salary and bonuses paid during the year at time t 
} The risk-free rate is the interest rate payable on short term government debt as It is virtually free from 










3.5.1.3 Data Collection 
~Ibe first source for the collection of data was McGregors Securities Exchange Digest. 
\'Vhen it was not provided in the the data was obtained directly from the financial 
statements. The data necessary for the calculation of the option ratio was obtained by 
analysing the financial statements of aU the firms in the 'granted' sample and extracting 
the value of the executive directors' cash salary and bonuses. The remaining variables 
necessary to compute Black-Scholes were available in these companies' financial 
statements, apart from four comparues that did not disclose the date that the options 
were granted. The option granting date is important because the share price on the date 
of grant is required to calculate the Black-Scholes value of the option. The company 
secretaries of these companies4 were telephoned, and the date of grant was obtained 
telephonically or by email. In the instances where only the month of grant was provided 
in the financial statements, the average share price for that month was calculated to be 
the share price on the date of grant. 
Where the strike price of the option was expressed in a foreign currency, the exchange 
rate at the date of grant was used to convert the strike price into Rands. The exchange 
rates were obtained from Reuters. The average Bankers Acceptance rate for the year 
was obtained from Datastream. The daily share prices were obtained from the database 
of Alliance Capital, an international financial institution. 
The dividend per share data in 2000 used in the dividend yieJd calculation was obtamed 
from McGregors Securities Exchange Digest. As McGregors Securities Exchange 
Digest did not contain aU the companies' most recent dividend per share figures, the 
dividend per share in 2001 was obtained by extracting the dividend declared from the 
Statement of Changes in Equity of the relevant comparues and dividing this by the 
number of shares in issue at the year end. The number of shares issued was computed 
by dividing the market capitalization by the share price at year end. Although two 
different methods were used to obtain the dividend per share in 2000 and 2001, the logic 
is the same and should not introduce any bias. 











3.5.2 Financial Reporting Variables 
3.5.2.1 Description 
When reporting low levels of accounting earnings, implicit costs emerge as a result of 
shareholder dissatisfaction and possible violations of debt covenants (Yermack 1995). 
Firms therefore try to anain a target level of earnings in order to avoid these costs. Due 
to there being no recognition in the mcome statement of share options granted, firms 
that are achieving earnings below their target level, may be more likely to issue share 
options as opposed to cash salaries to their executives as compensation. The firm would 
thereby avoid recognising an expense, which may reduce the difference between actual 
and target earnings (Matsunaga 1995). 
If a firm achieves earnings that are above Its target level, there are no financial reporting 
costs that arise: shareholders' take comfort in the above-expected results and the finn's 
creditors will be confident of debt repayments. In this situation, the balance between 
cash salaries and share options carmot be predicted. 'The finn can either grant options 
to reward executive directors for the good results, or not grant options in order to 
smooth the level of earnings to approximate the target level (Matsunaga 1995). The 
correct statistical relationship between firms with earnings above its target and the 
decision to grant options is therefore not known. 
Potential financial reporting costs may also affect the proJXJrtion of share options granted. 
A separate test that focuses only on companies in the 'granted' sample will be conducted 
for this purpose. Chapter 4.3.3 mc1udes the results and a discussion regarding this test. 
3.5.2.2 Measurement 
Many firms and stakeholders use return on equity (ROE) as a measure of performance. 
It is considered to be superior to measures such as earnings per share (EPS) or revenue 
growth because it incorporates capital investment; however it is not a good indicator of 
value creation. Value is created if retums are in excess of the COSt of capital, which 
ROE does not show (Solomou & Gustavsson 1999). l-Iowever it is still widely used, and 











ROE = Income attributable to ordinary shareholders 
Ordinary shareholders' equity 
(Equation 3) 
TIlls study follows a similar methodology to that used by Klassen and Mawani (2000), 
whereby the target ROE for each finn is assumed to follow a random walk with a drift. 
The drift is calculated as the geometrically declining weighted average of the change in 
ROE over the previous five years. The reason for this is that recent changes are more 
likely to influence expectations of the future as opposed to less recent changes, but the 
calculation is not restricted solely to the most recent year. If the finn had not been listed 
for five years, the drift for the target ROE was calculated as the geometrically declining 
weighted average based on the number of years the finn had been listed. The target and 
drift are calculated as folJows: 
ROE(Target t) = (1+drifi)*ROE tJ 
(Equation 4a) 
drift = liz [ROE t - ROE t-J] + Jj.! [ROE t-J - ROE t-2] + 1/8 [ROE 1-2 - ROE t.J] + 
1/16 [ROE l-J - ROE t-4] + 1/16 [ROEt-4 - ROEt.s] 
(Equation 4b) 
The target is then adjusted so that neither the drift nor the target is negative. The target 
is therefore the greater of the amount calculated in equation 3, the previous year's ROE 
and zero. 
The income attributable to ordinary shareholders for the current year is reduced by the 
after-tax Black-Scholes value of options granted, to reflect the situation if the options 
had been cash remuneration. If the value of the options had been cash remuneration, a 
tax deduction would have been obtained and hence the after-tax value is deducted. This 
calculation provides a fairer value for income attributable to ordinary shareholders as it 
incorporates the cost of remunerating executive directors with options. The adjusted 
figure is then divided by ordinary shareholders' equity, and the target is subtracted to 












DROE [NI ,- (l-etr)Y J / BY, - ROE(farget, J 
l\TI 1 is net income before extraordinary items 
etr is the effective tax rate 
Y is the Black-Scholes value of options granted 
BY is ordinary shareholders' equity 
(EquatIon 5) 
Separate tests were conducted on finns with a DROE above target ROE (PDROE) and 
finns with a DROE below target ROE (NDROE), in order to ascertain which variables 
become significantly associated with option granting depending on whether the finn has 
achieved a positive or negative DROE. ~Ibe results of these tests are discussed in 4.3.4 
and 4.3.5 respectively. 
The second financial reponing variable used in this study is the debt-equity ratio. Finns 
that substitute debt for equity are closer to violating cOntracts that are based on the 
attainment of financial ratios. Costs of violation will arise if these finns renege on their 
contracts. Finns with a large debt-equity ratio will probably substitute options for cash 
to preserve reported profits and cash. A positive relationship between the debt-equity 
ratio and option use is therefore antiCIpated. 
3.5.2.3 Data Collection 
The ROE figures, net income before extraordinary items, and the book value of 
shareholders' equity were all obtained from McGregors database. ~Ibe effective tax rate 
was obtained from the financial statements. 
The debt-equity ratio was calculated as the ratio of long-term liabilities to the book value 
of shareholders' equity. The long-tenn liabilities figure was also obtained from 
McGregors database. 
3.5.3 Tax Status VariabJes 
3.5.3.1 Description 
To determine the tax position of a finn, a measure used by Shevlin (1990) was adopted. 
Firms with a positive taxable income and no assessed losses are categorised as high 











negative taxable income and no assessed losses carned forward are categorISed as 
moderate marginal tax rate firms. Firms that have negative taxable incomes and 
assessed losses carried forward are categorised as low marginal tax rate finns. It is an 
extension of Yennack's (1995) measure that was based solely on the existence of assessed 
losses within the finn. NIatsunaga's (1995) measure of tax status was not appropriate as 
it was based on United States tax law, which is significantly different to our own and 
would therefore not be of assistance in providing a variable applicable to South African 
firms. 
3.5.3.2 Measurement 
The sign of taxable income was established by the following equation: 
'Where: 
TIBL NIBT - (L'lDT /str) 
TIEL is taxable income before assessed losses 
NIBT is net income before taxes 
str is the statutory tax rate of 30% 
(Equation 6) 
L'lDT is the change in the deferred tax balance sheet amount for the year 
This measure is then coded by two indicator variables. The high marginal tax rate 
indicator vanable (HM1R) is equal to one if there are loth no assessed losses carried 
forward and positive taxable income, and zero otherwise. Tbe moderate marginal tax 
rate indicator variable (MM1R) takes the value of one if either there are no assessed losses 
or there is a positive taxable income but not both, and zero otherwise. Ibe relationship 
between the firm's marginal tax rate and use of share options is expected to be negative 
as no tax deduction is available to the company. 
3.5.3.2 Data Collection 
It is a requirement ill terms of AC102 paragraph 85(e) and (i) to disclose the amount of 
unused tax losses that have and have not been recogillsed. The eXIstence of an assessed 
loss carried forward was therefore determined by scrutInising the taxation note to the 
financial statements for a commentary stating that tax losses are available for set-off 
against future taxable income and inspecting the deferred tax asset. The deferred tax 











had been recogrused as a result of an assessed loss. The deferred tax balances and net 
income before tax were extracted from the financial statements. 
Another method of determining the sign of taxable income is to inspect the sign of the 
current tax figure within the taxation note to the financial statements. However, some 
firms are liable to both local and foreign tax authorities and split the current tax between 
these parties. Mining firms also split their taxation charge into mining and non-mining, 
and in some cases one of the amounts is positive and the other zero. It was considered 
more appropriate to use a formula that can be applied to all firms, as opposed to 
individual analysis of the taxation charge. 
3.5.4 Agency Variables 
A description of each of the following variables selected as proxies for agency costs has 
already been made in chapter 2.4.1 and reiterated in 3.2.2.1. This section therefore only 
contains a discussion on the measurement and the process used to collect the relevant 
data. 
3.5.4.1 Variance of Share Returns 
The variance of share returns was calculated as the 60-month variance of market adjusted 
returns. For the purposes of this study, the All Share Index (ALSI) was used as a proxy 
for the market, and the market-adjusted returns were calculated by subtracting the daily 
change in the ALSI from the daily change in the fInn's share price. The variance was 
calculated from returns. The change ill share price was not adjusted for the effects 
of dividends declarations, as the dates that dividends were declared were not publicly 
available. An employee of Cadiz Holdings Ltd, a financial market strategist, confirmed 
that the lack of a dividend adjustment should not significantly effect the results of this 
study. 
3.5.4.2 The Ratio of Research and Development Expenditure to Total Assets 
TIle amount of and development expenditure that was expensed during the year 
was obtained from the income statement or the notes thereto. It is a disclosure 
requirement in terms of AC129 paragraph 117 to disclose this figure separately, and if no 











development was incurred during the year. The book value of assets was obtained from 
McGregors' database. 
As expenditure on research and development is not prevalent within the financial sector, 
a separate test was conducted on data that excluded the financial sector. The results of 
this test can be found in chapter 4.2.6. 
3.5.4.3 Five-year Growth in Assets 
Growth in assets was measured as the five-year growth in total assets, and such growth 
was expected to be positively correlated with the granting of options. If the finn had 
not been listed for five years, the growth in total assets was calculated for the period 
during which it was listed. TIlls should not introduce any bias into the results. 
3.5.4.4 The Market-to-Book Ratio 
Ibe market-to-book ratio was calculated by dividing the market value at the end of the 
firm's financial year by the book value of its equity as per McGregors' database. The 
market value was obtained from Alliance Capital. 
3.5.4.5 The Ratio of the 60-month Variance of Market-adjusted Returns to Total 
Returns 
1be calculation of the 60-month variance of market-adjusted returns was discussed in 
3.4.4.1. The 60-month variance of total returns was calculated from the daily share price 
of the firm for the previous five years, up until the year end. The ratio was then 
obtained by taking the fonner variance and dividing it by the latter. The daily share 
price was obtained from Alliance Capital. 
3.5.4.6 The Ratio of the Variance in Return on Equity to the Variance in Share 
Returns 
The variance in return on equiry was calculated from the return on equiry figures 
discussed in 35.2.1 above. The variance of shareholder returns was discussed m 35.4 L 











3.5.4.7 Industry Variables 
The finns were divided into nine industry categories. These are resources; basic 
industries; financials; non-cyclical consumer goods; cyclical consumer goods; cyclical 
services; general industrials; infonnation technology and non-cyclical services. Appendix 
C shows the firms' industry classification based on itS classification by the JSE Secunties 
Exchange. 
3.5.5 Other Control Variables 
3.5.5.1 Market Value 
The market value at the firm's year-end was used as a proxy for size and was obtained 
from the database of Alliance Capital 
3.5.5.2 lbe Ratio of Operating Cash flow to Equity 
The operating cash flow figure was obtained from the Cash Flow Statement in the 
financial statements, and the book value of equity was the same as that used to calculate 
ROE in 3.4.2.1 above. 
3.6 Regression Model 
The relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables can be 
established by performing multiple regression analysis. A regression equation is based 
on the assumption that a linear relationship exists between the dependent and 
independent variables. It is therefore necessary to test whether this is indeed the case. 
The correlation coefficients between each of the independent variables and the 
dependent vanable indicate whether a liner relationship exists. The correlation 
coefficients for each of the variables can be fOlmd in Table 3.1, Panel A The only 
variable that is significantly correlated with the option ratio is the market value. The 
DROE,HM1R, MJ\..1TR and debt-equity ratio do not appear to have a linear relationship 
with the option ratio. 
Secondly, the assumption regarding the error tenn that applies to multiple regression is 
that the error £: must be nonnally distributed. Since the dependent variable (y) is a linear 











Honert 1997). To test whether the assumption of nonnality is apparent in the data, a 
non-parametric method known as the Kolmogorov-Smimov (K-S) Test was conducted. 
The hypothesis tested was as follows: 
Ho : the data is nonnaUy distributed 
. the data is not nonnally distributed 
The results appear in Table 3.1, Panel B and reveal that the null hypothesis for all of the 
variables was rejected at the 1 % level. This shows that none of the variables in the 
regression equation are nonnaUy distributed, and consequently, multiple regressJOn 
analysis cannot be perfonned on the raw data .. Table 3.1, Panel C contains descnptive 
statistics for the raw data. 
Due to the non-nonnality and non-linearity of the data, two procedures known as Rank 
Regression and the nonnal scores approach were conducted on the data. Cooke (1998) 
suggested these approaches, together with log-of-the-odds ratio in 1998. argued that 
when there is evidence of non-nonnality and non-independence of the error tenn; 
heteroscedasticirl; as well as problems of outliers and non-linearity, a transfonnation of 
the variables is necessary to make the statistical analysis more meaningful. 
The Rank Regression procedure involves ranking the observations from smalJest to 
largest, and undertaking a regression on the ranks. It has the advantage of being 
distribution-free, so that tests conducted on ranked data do not require the data to be 
nonnaUy distributed. It is also not necessary to standardize, log or undertake any power 
transfonnation, because these methods result in the same assignment of ranks. 
Furthennore, rank transfonnatlon is relatively insensitive to outliers, and is useful when 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is non-linear or 
unknown (Cooke 1998). Rank Regression is therefore a suitable option for this study. 
Log-of-the-odds ratio is only applicable when the assumptions of a linear regression 
model hold, and is therefore not suitable in this study. 
The nonnal scores approach transfonns the data to the nonnal distribution by dividing 
the distribution into the number of observations plus one regjons on the basis that each 
region has equal probability. The ranks of the dependent variable are therefore 










substituted by scores on the nom1al distribution, and the regression analysis is perfonned 
using the nonnal scores as the dependent variable. Cooke also suggests that the 
transfonnation to nonnal scores should involve both the dependent and independent 
variables, because by changing only the dependent variable the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is also implicitly changed. 
Cooke's (1998) reasons for supporting the nonnal scores approach were that the 
resulting tests have statistical properties because significance levels can be determined 
and the F and t-tests are meaningful. Furthermore, the regression coefficients derived 
from using normal scores are more meaningful than those denved from Rank 
Regression; and it is a means by which non-nonnal dependent variabJes can be 
transfonned into nonnal ones, and a nonnally distributed dependent variable implies that 
the errors are also nonnally distributed. For these reasons, Cooke proposed that the 
advantages of using nomul scores outweigh those of Rank Regression. However, for 
the purposes of this study, tests using both the ranked and the nonnal scores data were 
conducted. Three of the variables were not transfonned into ranks and nomul scores, 
namely the high and moderate marginal tax rate varIables and the industry variable. TIlls 
is due to the fact that these variables do not measure data, but are instead indicator 
variables for an underlying fact. 
The nonnal scores of ranked data were calculated and tabulated by Harter (1961). These 
values were used to convert the ranked data in this study into nonnal data. Harter's 
nonnal scores are based on the following equation: 
Where: 
Zj ~-I(i/n+1) (Equation 7) 
Zl nomlal score 
~.l the inverse of the N(O,l) cumulauve density function 
i = ranki 
The data was ranked using the sequential ranking function in Statistica, a statistical 
software package. Sequential ranking was selected as there were a number of Finns WIth 
option ratios equal to zero, and the sequential function deals with this issue by ranking 











statistics for the ranked and nonnal scores data can be fOlU1d in Table 3.2, Panel A and B 
respectively. It can be seen from Panel A that the mean of the ranked data is 31 and the 
standard deviations of each variable are the same, except for the three variables that were 
not ranked. Panel B also shows that the variable's means are close to zero. Ths is 
expected due to the fact that half of the nonnal scores are positive, and the other half are 
equal but negative, and had similar standard deviations. The residuals of both the 
ranked and normal scores transfonnations were displayed and were found to be nonnally 
distributed. Therefore, tests were conducted on both the ranked and the nonnal scores 
data, and the results are compared in Chapter 4. 
Based on the fact that the data has been transfonned into nonnal and linear clata, 
multiple regression analysis could then be performed using Statistica. The following 
regression model was estimated: 
OR CXo + cx1DROE + cxlD/E + cx}HM1R + cx4.MiVI1R + cx50CF/BV + cx&MV + 
cx7MKT AD] + cxgMADL TOT + cx9G _ASSETS + cx10MV _ BV + cxJlR D + 
(Equation 8) 
Where: OR optIon ratIo 
= deviation of ROE from target 
= long tenn debt divided by book value of equity 
DROE 
DIE 
tIMIR high marginal tax rate indicator that equals one if there are (a) 
no assessed losses carned forward and (b) positive taxable income, 
and zero otherwise. 
moderate marginal tax rate indicator that equals one if either (a) 
or (b) above exists, and zero otherwise 
OCF/BV = operating cash flow divided by the book value of shareholders' 
eqwty 
MY the finn's market value of equity 
MKT AD] the variance of market-adjusted returns 
MADLTOT = the ratio of market-adjusted renuns to total rerums 
G ASSETS = the five-year growth in assets 











RD = rhe ratio of research and development expenditure to total 
assets 
VROE VSp the ratio of the variance in return on equiry to the variance in 
share price 
An ordinary multiple regression analysis was conducted on the data, as weD as a forward 
stepwise multiple regression analysis and an analysis after adjusting for the effects of 
multicollinerairy. A forward stepwise regression procedure checks to see if the 'best' 
variable not yet in the regression model can enter the model, and those variables already 
in the model are checked to see if one can be removed from the model until such time as 
no further variables can enter or leave the model (van den Honen 1997). 
Multicollinearity exists when explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another. 
It is preferable to have explanatory variables that are as far as possible uncorrelated with 
one another, so that together they offer maximum explanation (van den Honen 1997). 
All of these analyses were conducted on the overall data, firstly using the ranked data and 
secondly the normal scores data. Additional tests were also conducted on specific data, 
such as examining the overall data without finns from the financial sector included and 
examining the financial sector separately. These two tests were conducted because finns 
in the financial sector have no research and development expenditure and their 
composition of long-term debt is not the same as other sectors. A further test that was 
conducted was that the deviation from return on equity was given an absolute value (one 
or zero) depending on whether the finn was above or below its target ROE. This test 
was performed to determine whether the fact that the DROE is positive or negative is 
sigruficantly associated with option granting. Furthermore, firms in the 'granted' sample 
were analysed separately. Finally, only those finns that had negative DROE's were 
examined to determine whether the fact that the firm is below its target ROE is 
sigruficantly associated with option granting. A similar test was conducted on finns with 











3.7 Limitations and Points of Consideration 
3.7.1 The Appropriateness of using the Number of Options Granted in the 
Dependent Variable 
The reason behind the granting of options has an important bearing on this Study. If 
the decision regarding the granting of share options is at the discretion of the 
remuneration committee, and is not an agreed upon annual procedure outlined in the 
share option scheme, then the use of a dependent variable that is based on the number 
of options granted during the year is an appropriate variable for this study. However, if 
the share option scheme specifically states the quantity of options to be granted per 
annum, then the annual option grant cannot be influenced by the problem of agency, the 
tax or financial position of the company or any other finn-specific factors. In this 
situation, it would be more appropriate to use a variable based on the date on which the 
share option scheme arose. 
This study assumes that the granting of options is a discretionary decision, and is 
dependent on the company's circumstances at that time. 
3.7.2 The Appropriateness of the Tax Variable 
The lax position of companies in this Study is detemUned by the group's taxable income 
and assessed loss status. However, a possible situation could be a financially sound 
holding company that is granting options to Jts directors, whilst its subsidiary is doing 
poorly and has an assessed loss. From a group perspective, this company will have 
granted options, but would be classified as having either a moderate or low tax status as a 
result of the subsidiary'S situation, even if the holding company itself has a high tax 
position. A more appropriate variable would therefore be based on the holding 
comparues tax SItuation. 
However, financial statements do not often disclose where the assessed loss arose and it 
is therefore difficult to attribute the assessed loss to either the holding company or its 
subsidiaries. Furthennore, in some group structures the holding company simply 











and would therefore not be liable for tax. In these situations, the tax position of the 
holding company would be an inappropriate variable. For these reasons the group's tax 
situation is used in this study. 
3.7.3111e Effect of Goodwill Write-offs on Return on Equity 
Compames that previously wrote off goodwill to share premium before AC131 Business 
Gmbinations became effective, will have distorted retum on equity figures. In the year in 
which they wrote off goodwill in this way, return on equity would be unusually high, and 
every year thereafter would be affected as well as a result of the roll over of the equity 
figure. 
Thus far no publicly available data has been adjusted for the effects of goodwill write-
offs against share premium. If one were to adjust for this manually, it would require 
mspecting the financial statements of the companies in the sample for the year in which 
AC131 became effective (years commencing on or after 1 July 1999); identifying from 
the change in accounting policy note whether goodwill was previously written off against 
share premium; if so, adding this amount back to share premium; deciding on an 
appropriate amortisation period and adjusting the following year's net incomes by the 
amortised amount. Although it is acknowledged that an adjusted return on equity would 
improve the quality of the deviation from return on equity variable, the impact that the 
process of adjusting the data would have on the results of this study is not likely to make 
it a worthwhile exercise. For this reason, return on equity has sinlply been calculated as 
profit attributable to ordinary shareholders divided by ordinary shareholders' equity. 
3.7.4 The Existence of a Remuneration Committee 
Ihis study assumes that the decision to grant options is not one that is partial to personal 
preferences, but rather one that is independent and based on the company's situation. If 
a company has a remuneration committee, it can be assumed that the decision to grant 
options is an independent one. However if no remuneration committee exists, then the 
option granting decision could possible be influenced by indi\t~dual desires arId not 











It is likely that most, if not all of the companies in the sample have a remuneration 
committee, as they are amongst the largest and most reputable companies in South 
Africa. It is also beyond the scope of this study to focus on the corporate governance 
issues of share option schemes, and for these reasons the existence of a remuneration 
committee has been disregarded. 
3.7.5 Options Granted to Holding Company Directors 
Some companies have granted options to the directors of their holding company. The 
primary reason why share options are granted to directors is that shareholder and 
management interests become more closely aligned as a result. When a subsidiary grants 
share options to its holding company's directors, it is effectively granting a share option 
to a shareholder, and the purpose for this is not the reduction of agency costs, but rather 
a strategy that unites the various parties of the group. For the purposes of this study, 
these options have been ignored, as they are not granted for the same reasons as those 
that companies grant to their own directors. 
3.7.6 The Future Consequences of Granting Share Options 
A large quantity of research has been conducted overseas pertaining to share option 
grants. It is important to reiterate that this study seeks solely to identify variables that 
explain whether a South African firm is likely to grant share options to its executive 
directors or not. This study does not intend to investigate the effects of share option 
grants on the firm's capital structure, or on shareholders or debt holders. Furthermore, 
no attempt is made to estab]jsh an optimal strike price for share options. The future 
consequences of granting share options are therefore beyond the scope of this study. 
This study focuses primarily on the current position within the firm, that is its present 
day financial reporting position, tax, size and liquidity situation, and agency related issues. 
Whether these characteristics of the firm change subsequent to the granting of share 












This chapter contains a discussion of the variables and the process by which the research 
was conducted. The initial sample consisted of the top one hundred South African 
companies as determined by their market capitalisation on the JSE Securities Exchange 
on the 31 October 2001. Both their 2001 and 2000 financial statements were examined 
for infonnation penaliUng to share options. Due to inadequate disclosure, the sample 
size was reduced to a total of 61 companies over two years. 
The dependent variable, known as the option ratio, was calculated as the Black-Scholes 
value of the options granted by the firm during the current year, divided by the sum of 
this value and the cash salaries and bonuses paid by the firm during the year. Since most 
South African companies pay dividends, the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes model was 
used. 
Thirteen mdependent variables were selected to test whether they are significantly 
associated with option granting to execlltive directors. The first variable, the deviation 
from target return on equity (DROE), is based on the fact that when firms fail to meet 
income targets explicit costs arise from contracts that are based on the firm attaining 
those targets, and implicit costs arise as a result of shareholder dissatisfaction. The firms 
DROE may influence the decision of whether or not to grant options since firms do not 
have to recognise an expense when share options are granted. The debt-equity ratio was 
included as a variable because firms that have high debt components in their capital 
structure are expected to substitute options for cash to maintain their profits and cash. 
Firms do not obtain a tax deduCtion when they grant options, and their current tax 
position may therefore influence the granting of options. The measure for tax position 
categorised firms into high, moderate, and low marginal tax rate brackets, depending on 
the presence of assessed losses within the firm and whether the firm has positive or 
negative t;Lxable income. A negative association is anticipated between the option ratio 











The variance of shareholder returns was selected as a proxy for agency costs. This 
variance was calculated as the 60-month variance of market-adjusted reuUTIS and the All 
Share Index (ALSI) was used as a proxy for the The ratio of research and 
development expendirure to the book value of assets was selected as a proxy for growth 
as was the five-year growth in assets. The 60-month variance of market-adjusted reUUTIS 
to tOtal market returns was selected as a measure for the noise in share price that is not 
attributable to the market. A measure forthe noisiness of earnings relative to the share 
price was calculated as the ratio of the variance in reUUTI on equity for the previous five 
years to the variance in daily share price for the previous five years. Industry-specific 
differences were captured by allocating dummy variables to each firm depending on its 
industry classification. 
The firm's market value was selected as a proxy for the size of the firm and the firm's 
liquidity situation was represented by the ratio of operating cash flow to the book value 
of equity. 
When the data for each variable was scmtinised, there was a lack of linearity between the 
option ratio and the independent variables and the option ratio data was not normally 
distributed. Due to the non-normality and non-linearity of the data, two procedures 
known as Rank Regression and the normal scores approach were conducted on the data 
as suggested by Cooke (1998). These procedures transformed the data into normal, 
linear data that could be used in multiple regression analysis. 
A few limitations to this study were identified. It was considered appropriate to use a 
dependent variable that IS reliant on the number of options granted as opposed to the 
date that a share option scheme was established because the granting of options is 
considered to be a discretionary decision that is dependent on the company's 
Clfcumstances at that time. The use of the group's tax position as a proxy for tax status 
was also considered to be appropriate due to the difficulties of obtaining information 
regarding the holding company's tax position. 
It was also acknowledged that finns that previously wrote off goodwill agamst share 
premium would have distoned annual return on equity figures since the write off 
occurred. However, It was not considered wonhwhile to identify the fimls m which thle, 











options and the terms of the grant is an independent decision that is based on the 
company's situation and not influenced by personal preferences. Options that have 
been granted to direnors of the firm's holding company have been ignored in this study, 
as often they are not granted for the same reasons as those that are granted to the firm's 
own direnors. Finally, this study focuses primarily on the current position within the 




• All correlations at 5% or less are in bold. 
• All correlations at greater than 5% but less than 10% have been marked with an 
asterisk*. 
3.9.1 Glossary 
OPTION R Option Ratio 
DROE Deviation from Target Return on Equity 
HMIR High Marginal Tax Rate 
MMTR Moderate Marginal Tax Rate 
D E Debt -Equity Ratio 
OCF-BV Operating Cash flow to Book Value of Equity 
MY Market Value 
MKT _AD] 60-month Variance of Market-adjusted Returns 
MADL TOT Ratio of the 60-month Variance of Market-adjusted Returns to Total 
Returns 
G ASSETS Five-year Growth in Assets 
MY BV Market-to-Book Ratio 
R D Ratio of research and development expenditure to T oral Assets 
INDUSTRY Industry Dwnmy Variable 












J~ble 3.1: STATISTICS BEFORE DATA TRANSFORMATION 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
OPTION R 
-







MKT ADJ -0.12505 
MADLTOT -0.14451 
G ASSETS 0.07324 
MV BV 0.15458 
RD 0.38536 
INDUSTRY -0.04518 
VROE VSP 0.10789 
Panel B: Kolmogorov-Smimov Test 
OPTION R (allvar.Sta) 










28 28 45.90164 45.90164 
\.00000 < x< 13.11475 .. 59.01639 


























Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 
.......... 
VaJjdN Mean 1v1inimum Maximum 
OPTION R 61 0.18591 0.00000 
DROE 61 -0.09897 -1.94660 
HMTR 61 0.50820 0.00000 
:tvfMTR 61 0.36066 0.00000 
DE 61 0.52406 0.00000 
OCFBV 61 0.25336 -1.22248 
MY 61 22,712,880,131 1,150,542,700 
MKT AD] 61 103446 
MADLTOT 61 0.37649 1.36025 
G ASSETS 61 18.80371 8.83691 
MY BV 61 0.69818 -0.54075 2.35710 0.66103 
IR D 61 0.67442 0.00000 17.00000 2.82033 
I INDUSTRY 61 3.32787 1.00000 9.00000 2.24144 
VROE VSP 61 31.17489 0.00000 1044.74911 137.67717 
Table 3.2: STATISTICS AFTER DATA lRANSFORMA TION 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Ranked Data 
! ValidN Mean ! Minimum Maximum S(d.Dev. 
OPTION_R 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
IDROE 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
·HMTR 61 0.508197 0 1 0504082 
MMTR 61 0.360656 0 1 0.484176 
DE 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
I OCF __ B V 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
IMY 61 31 1 61 17.75293 I 
MKT ADJ 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
lMADJJOT 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
G ASSETS 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
MY BV 61 31 1 61 17.75293 
... - .. __ ... 
RD 61 '31 1 61 17.75293 
~ 
INDUSTRY 61 3.327869 1 9 2.241438 











Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Nonnal Scores Data 
ValidN Mean Minimum Maximum StdDev. 
DROE 61 0.007259 1.94232 2.32556 0.960454 I 
H1vITR 61 0.5 0 1 0.504219 
MM1R 61 0.366667 0 1 0.485961 
----
D _E 61 0.021495 -1.94232 2.32556 0.96392 
OCFBV 61 0.023572 -1.94232 2.32556 0.963335 
IMY 61 -0.00El78 1.94232 2.32556 0.952673 
!MADl 61 0.035247 -1.94232 2.32556 0.954835 
iMADlJOT 61 0.002764 -1.94232 2.32556 0.9-5"6-631 
G_ASSETS 61 -0.00218 -1.94232 2.32556 0.950884 
MY BV 61 -0.00764 -1.94232 2.32556 0.942639 
Rp 61 0.021495 -1.94232 2.32556 0.96392 
INDUSTRY 61 3.366667 I 9 2.239602 













Ine objective of this chapter is to present the findings, based on the methodologies 
described in Chapter 3. In addition, the results are compared and contrasted to the findings 
of previous research and an attempt is made to explain the differences observed. Ibis 
chapter begins with a section describing the overall results, followed by a review of various 
supplementary tests that were conducted, and finally a summary of the results is presented. 
4.2 Overall Results -_. __.. - .. _-
As discussed in section 3.6, two separate regression analyses were conducted on the data. 
The first analysis was based on data that had been ranked, and the second analysis was based 
on the normal scores of the ranked data. The results of these two analyses are discussed 
separately below. 
4.2.1 Ranked Data 
'Ine results of the regression analysis conducted on the ranked data are presented in the 
three sections according to the analyses that was performed: ordinary mulnpJe regression, 
forward stepwise multiple regression and ordinary multiple regression after adjusting for the 
effects of multicollinearity. 
All three sections contain a discussion of the vanables that were found to be significant al 
1 %, 5% and 10%, and comparisons are made between the results of each of the three 
sections as well as the results of prior studies. 










The ordinary multiple regression section below also contains a discussion on the correlation 
analysis that was performed on the variables prior to conducting the multiple regression test. 
section covering the multiple regression analysis after adjusting for the effects of 
multicollinearity includes a discussion on the correlations between the mdependent variables, 
and the variables that were selected to be eliminated from the analysis. 
4.2.1.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression 
TIle correlation between the dependent variable and each of the independent vanables was 
computed, and can be seen in Table 4.1, Panel N. Significant positive correlations were 
fOlmd between the option ratio and each of the market value of the firm, the research and 
development indicator variable, and the ratio of the variance in return on equity to the 
variance in share price. The implied positive linear relationship between the option ratio 
and these three independent variables means that as the size of the firm and the extent of 
research and development expenditure and the noise in earnings per share relative to share 
price increases, the proportion of options granted to total executive compensation will also 
mcrease. 
TIle results of the regression analysis appear in Table 4.2, Panel B. This panel also includes 
statistical values such as R2, adjusted R2 and the standard error of the estimate. The 
coefficient of multiple determination (R ~ shows that the regression line explains 65% of the 
total error that would have been present had no regression line been fined After adjusting 
for the number of explanatory variables in the model, 55% (adjusted R; of the total error 
that would have been present had no regression line been fined is explained by the 
regression line. The independent vanables therefore explain a fairly significant percentage 
of the variation in the option ratio. The standard error of the estimate measures the extent 
to which the observed data points deviate from the fined regression line. The calcuhted 
value of 11.843 implies that the regression line lies at some distance from the actual data 
POlTIts. 
At the significance level, the market value and research and development variables were 
found to be significantly positively associated "vith the option ratio. This suggests that 










firms and firms with growth opportunities are more likely to grant options. Firm size was 
also fOlU1d to be a significant variable by Gaver and Gaver (1993); Smith and WaITS (1992) 
and Klassen and Mawani (2000). The use of research and development expenditure as a 
proxy for growth opportunities was also found to be significant in studies conducted by 
Gaver and Gaver (1993); Baber et al (1996); Bushman et al (1996); Douglas et al (1997) and 
Klassen and Mawani (2000). 
The industry dwnmy variable was significant at the 5% level, which suggests that option 
granting behaviour may differ across industries. Smith and WaITS (1992), Ely (1991) and 
Klassen and Mawani (2000) and Yermack (1995) also found support for the fact that the 
granting of options may be influenced by the firm's industry. 
The ratio of the variance of return on equity to the variance in share price was significantly 
positively associated with the option ratio at 10%. This is consistent with the theory 
suggested by Lambert and Larcker (1987), Eaton and Rosen (1993) and Lewellen et al (1987), 
namely that firms that experience a high variability in earnings relative to share price use 
share option granting as a means of compensation. It therefore appears that South African 
firms with erratic earnings performance relative to share price performance grant options to 
executive directors instead of constantly revising their salaries. 
The high marginal tax rate variable was significant at slightly over 10%, consistent with the 
results of Klassen and Mawani (2000) and contrary to Matsunaga (1995) and Yermack 
(1995). Although a significant relationship exists, the sign of the beta coefficient was 
positive, which suggests that firms in a high marginal tax rate situation are more likely to 
grant options to their executive directors. The theory that the lack of a tax deduction wiJI 











A possible reason for this is that many of the finns in the high marginal ta.x rate category of 
the 'granted' sample are established, successful, well-known and financially prosperous finns, 
and may see share options as a very appropriate and attractive fonn of compensation 
irrespective of the lack of a tax deduction. 
4.2.1.2 Stepwise Multip1e Regression 
A forward stepwise regression was conducted on the data to determine whether similar 
results to those in 4.2.1.1 would be obtained if only the best explanatory variables are 
included in the model. The results can be seen in Table 4.1, Panel C. 
The W fell slightly to 62%, but the adjusted R2 improved to 57% as did the standard error of 
the estimate to 11.606. Therefore, although less of the total error is explained by the 
stepwise regression model, based on the nwnber of explanatory variables and the smaller 
distance between the observed pointS and the regression line, it appears to be a bener model. 
Market value and research and development were the most positively significant variables at 
1 %, the industry dununy variable was positively significant at 5% and the growth in assets 
was, surprisingly, negatively Significant at 5%. 
The results are therefore consistent with the ordinary regression model, except that the ratio 
of the variance of return on equity to the variance m share price was no longer significant in 
the stepwise model, although it was included as a variable. Furthennore, growth in assets 
became a significant variable but in the opposite direction to what was predicted. This was 
inconsistent with the results of Lambert and Larcker (1987). A possible reason for the 
negative relationship between the option ratio and growth in assets may be due to the fact 
that the majority of the finns in the sample expenenced a growth in assets irrespective of 
whether they granted options or not: of the 61 firms m the sample, 52 firms' assets grew 
over the five-year period and only 5 firms in 'granted' sample and 4 firms in the 'not granted' 
sample did not achieve a growth in assets. The declme in assets of the 5 firms In the 
'granted' sample was larger than that of the 4 firms in the 'not granted' sample, which 
may have contributed towards the result that a negative growth in assets is associated with 











4.2.1.3 After Adjusting for the Effects of Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another. It 
is preferable to have explanatory variables that are as far as possible uncorrelated with one 
another, so that together they offer maximum explanation (van den Honen 1997). One way 
of overcoming multicollinearity is to eliminate one of the twO correlated variables from the 
model. 
The correlations between the independent variables can be seen in Table 4.1, Panel D. As a 
result of the large correlations shown in bold, the following variables were eliminated from 
the analysis: the rugh marginal tax rate variable; the ratio of the variance of market adjusted 
returns to the vanance of total returns; the variance of market adjusted returns and the ratio 
of operating cash flow to the book value of equity. Although other independent variables 
were significantly correlated at the 5% level, only the pairs of variables that had correlation 
coefficients between them of more than 0.5 or Jess than -0.5 were scmtinised for 
elimination. 
Tbe regression summary can be seen ill Table 4.1, Panel E. Ibe adjusted R2 was 55%, 
wruch indicates that the amount of explanatory power of the remaining variables is still as 
strong as the original multiple regressIOn model, although the standard error of the estin13te 
increased slightly. Interestingly, the four variables that were significant in the stepwise 
regression model were once again significant, and ill the same direaion. These variables 
were market value and research and development at 1%, industry at 5% and growth in assets 
at 10%. Therefore, performing twO different tests, namely adjusting for the effects of 
multicollinearity and performing a stepwise regression procedure, achieved very similar 
results. 
4.2.2 Nonnal Scores Data 
The results of the nonnal scores data are presented in the following three seaions accordIng 
to the analyses that were performed. These sections follow the same stmcture as that 











4.2.2.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression 
The ranked data were convened to nonnal scores and the correlations between the 
independent variables and the option ratio were calculated, as shown in Table 4.2, Panel A. 
These results reveal that only the market value of the finn and the research and development 
expenclirure variable are statistically correlated with the option ratio at 5%. The conversion 
from ranked data to nonnal scores therefore resulted in the exclusion of the ratio of the 
variance in rerum on equity to the vanance in share price as a highly correlated variable with 
the option ratio. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis are contained within Table 4.2, Panel B. The 
R2 value of 48% and the adjusted R2 of 33% were lower than those of the mwtiple regression 
analysis on the ranked data. The regression equation that emerged from the nonnal scores 
data is therefore less proficient at explaining the amount of error inherent in the data than 
the equation that emerged from the ranked data. However, the standard error of the 
estimate was substantially reduced to 0.79049, which reveals that there is hardly any 
clifference between the observed data points and the fitted regression line. Thus although 
there is still a great amount of unexplained variation in the data, the regression line that has 
been fonnulated lies very near to the observed points. 
Consistent with the results of the ranked data, the market value of the finn was positively 
significant at 1%. The only other significant variable was the market -to-book value of 
equity, which wa.~ significantly negatively correlated at 10%. This reswt is contrary to the 
findings of Smith and Watts (1992) and Lewellen et at (1987) who found a significant positive 
association between option granting behaviour and the market-to-book ratio used as a proxy 
for investment opportunities. A possible explanation is that on average, firms in the 'not 
granted' sample had a higher market-to-book ratio than finns in the 'granted' sample. 
Specifically, only Anglo Platmun1, lmplats, Tigerbrands and Bidve~1 in the 'granted' sample 
had large market-to-book ratios. Most of the other finns in the 'granted' sample had 
market-to-book ratios of just over one, whereas the Finns in the 'not granted' sample 











4.2.2.2 Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Ibe stepwise regression results can be seen in Table 4.2, Panel C As with the stepwise 
procedure using the ranked data, the R2 value declined from the ordinary multiple 
regression'S R2 value of 48% to 44%, but the adjusted R2 value improved from 33% to 39%. 
Therefore based on the adjusted R2 values, the stepwise regressIon procedure provided a 
better explanation of the total error than ordinary muJtiple regression. The standard error 
of the estimate of 0.75208 was once again low, implying that the regression line lies close to 
the observed data points. 
The resWts show that the same three variables that were sigillficant in the stepwise 
regression procedure using ranked data were sigillficant using normal scores data. The 
market value of the firm was positively sigillficant at 1%, as was the research and 
development expenditure variable at 5% and the growth in assets was once again negatively 
significant at 10%. The stepwise model did not select the industry dummy variable that was 
significant using ranked data.: In addition, the market-to-book ratio was not found to be 
significant, contrary to the findings using ordinary multiple regression model. 
4.2.2.3 After Adjusting for the Effects of Multicollinearity 
rThe correlation matrix in Table 4.2, Panel D reveals that some of the independent variables 
are correlated between themselves. Once again, one of the variables from each pair of 
variables that were highly correlated between themselves were eliminated from the 
regression model, namely the high marginal tax rate vanable and the ratio of the variance of 
market adjusted returns to the variance of total returns. 
The resWts of the regression model adjusted for the effects of multicollineanty can be seen 
in Table 4.2, Panel E. The R2 value of 47% reveals that although twO variables have been 
excluded, the amount of error explained by the regression line has hardly decreased from 
what was explained by ordinary multiple regression. This is expected as two or more 
variables were explaming the same error in the ordinary multiple regressIOn model. The 











explanatory variables in the model and the effeas of multicollinearity it is a berrer fit than 
the ordinary multiple regression model. 
The market value of the finn was significantly positively associated with the option ratio at 
1 %, and the market -to-book ratio and the research and development expenditure variable 
were respectively, significantly negatively and positively associated with the option ratio at 
10%. These results are similar to those obtained using ordinary multiple regression (in 
4.2.2.1 above) except that the research and development variable became significant when 
the effects of multicollineraity was adjusted for. This may be due to the faa that the 
research and development variable and the ratio of the variance of market adjusted returns 
to the variance of tOtal returns were correlated at the 10% level, thus the elimination of the 
larrer may have contributed tOwards the significance of the former. 
4.2.3 Preliminary Summary 
The overall results therefore imply that South African firms are not influenced by tax or 
financial performance nor by liquidity, but rather by firm size and reduced agency costs by 
pursuing long-term investment opportunities. The firm's industry classification has also 
been found to influence the decision to grant share options. Ibe table below summarises 
the results thus far: 
Table 4A Preliminary Summary 
Key: 
ASSETS Five-year Growth in Assets 











MY Market Value 
MY BV Market-to-Book Ratio 
R D Tne Ratio of Research and Development Expenditure to Total Assets 
VROE VSP The Ratio of The Variance in Return on Equity to the Variance in Share 
Returns 
Thus it appears from the overall ranked and normal scores resuJts that the larger the market 
value, the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets and the lower the 
growth in assets, the more likely it is that firms will grant options. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that option granting behaviour may differ across industries. There is some evidence 
that the lower the finn's market-to-book ratio and the higher the noise in earnings relative to 
share price, the more likely it is that the firm will grant options. 
4.2.4 Variables that were Not Significant 
The following variables were found not to be significant. Possible reasons for this are 
provided below. 
4.2.4.1 Deviation from Target Return on Equity 
Unlike Klassen and Mawani (2000) and Matsunaga (1995), but consistent with Yermack 
(1995) the devIation from target return on equity was not found to be significantly associated 
with the granting of options. A possible reason for this is that firms may decide to grant 
options at a time when the financial outcome for the year cannot be accurately prediaed: the 
extent to which a finn's return on equity is above or below a target may only be known at 
the end of the financial year, whereas the decision to grant options can be made at any stage 
during the year. An additional explanatIon may be that in South Afnca, the consequences of 
a firm not attaining a specific target may not be as severe as the consequences in the United 
States and Canada, and the need to avoid recognising an expense may not be as large. 
In addition, shareholders, exeC1ltive direaors and employees may also have a different 
perception of what the target return on equity is, which would change the extent of the 











financial reporting benefits when they decide to grant options. The implication of this is 
that the introduaion of ED160 should not affea option granting behaviour, as the current 
non-recognition of a share option expense does not appear to motivate firms below their 
target ROE to grant options or influence finns above their target ROE in any way. 
4.2.4.2 Tax Status 
Contrary to Klassen and Mawani (2000) once again, but consistent with Matsunaga (1995) 
and Yennack (1995) the firm's tax situation did not appear to be a highly significant faaor to 
the fiffil when deciding whether or not to grant options. Indeed, the high marginal tax rate 
variable was only sigrllficant at just over 10%, and it was positively significant even though a 
negative relationship had been prediaed. A reason for this is possibly due to the 
composition of the data in that the 'granted' sample contained a lot of financially successful 
fiffils that were generally classified in the 'high marginal tax rate' bracket. This would have 
contributed to the positive relationship. However overall there was not much support for 
the tax variables, which implies that fiffils are not influenced by the non-deduaibility of 
options when deciding whether or not to grant them. 
4.2.4.3 Debt-Equity Ratio 
Ibe debt-equity ratio was also not significant, consistent with the results of Matsunaga 
(1995), Mehran (1995) and Yeffilack (1995), but contrary to the results of Lewellen et al 
(1987) and Klassen and Mawani (2000). It therefore appears that South African companies 
do not substitute cash salaries for options when they are in high debt situations. Perhaps 
this is due to the fact that South African finns with large debt give priority to other maITers 
that are affeaed by their level of debt, and do not allow their debt situation to affect their 
decision of whether or not to grant options. Furthermore, only four fiffils in the 'granted' 
sample had debt in excess of equity, as did only three fiffils in the 'not granted' sample. 
Thus, the small nwnber of fiffils with high debt-equity ratios may have contributed towards 
the lack of statistical significance of the ratio. 
A further unusual result was that the multiple regression analysis on the ranked data resulted 











multiple regression conduaed on the nonnal scores data suggested a positive relationship 
between the two, as was the prediaed relationship. A possible reason for the negative 
relationship was suggested by Yemlack (1995) who argued that if managers have strong 
incentives to maximise the value of equity, debt holders will demand a higher nsk premium 
for supplying capital because they will fear that management will pursue overly risky 
investment projeas that transfer wealth from debt holders to equity holders. TIlese 
coniliaing results do however reaffinn that the correa statistical relationship between the 
debt-equity ratio and the option ratio is not known, even for South African firms. 
4.2.4.4 The Ratio of Operating Cash Flow to the Book Value of Equity 
The ratio of the operating cash flow to the book value of equity was also not fOlmd to be 
significantly associated with option granting. 1bis finding is contrary to that of Yermack 
(1995), but supports the results of KJassen and Mawani (2000) and Matsunaga (1995). TIlls 
result suggests that finns in a low liquidity situation are not more likely to grant options. 
Perhaps this is due to the faa that low liquidity is a charaaeristic of an under·perfomling 
firm, and remuneration in the fonn of share options may not be attraaive to the executives 
unless the finn has positive future prospeas. It is worth noting however, that the beta 
coefficient for this variable was negative as prediaed 
4.2.4.5 The Variance of Market-Adjusted Returns and the Ratio of the Variance of 
Market-Adjusted Returns to Total Returns 
1be variance of market-adjusted returns and the ratio of the variance of market-adjusted 
returns to total returnS were also not significant. The fonner result suggests that South 
African firms do not align their interests with shareholders by granting shares to executive 
rureaors when they embark on variance-mcreasing investments, as was proposed by 
Lewellen et ai (1987) and supported by Smith and WattS (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993) and 
Klassen and Mawani (2000). A possible reason for this result was noted by Lewellen et ai, 
namely that variance-increasing investments increase the executives personal risk exposure 
and might make the executives relunant to chose such investments in the first place. 
Another reason might be the faa that options on a share whose price is highly volatile nught 
not be seen as an appealing form of compensation, unless the executives believe that the 











variable and the option ratio cannot be accurately defined, as the beta coefficient was 
negative using the ranked data and positive using the normal scores data. 
A reason for the ratio of the variance of market-adjusted rerurns to total returns not being 
significant might also be as a result of the reasons suggested above, as well as the fact that 
the firm's share price movement that is anributable to the market may not influence option 
granting. Perhaps a further reason is that firms consider their own specific circumstances 
when deciding whether to grant options, instead of looking at their own performance 
relative to the market. The beta coefficient of this variable was however positive as 
predicted. 
4.2.5 A Possible Reason for the High Significance of Market Value 
In this !>'tudy, the firms in the 'granted' sample for 2001 and 2000 were much larger than 
those in the 'not granted' sample: the mean total assets of the firms in the 2001 'granted' 
sample was R54 billion, whereas the mean total assets in the 2001 ' not granted' sample was 
R9 billion. TIlls is due to the fact that mainly the larger firms provided the information 
reqwred to compute option values. Either these firms are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and are required to disclose the relevant information in terms of United Kingdom 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice, or the high quality of disclosure that often exists in 
larger firms resulted in the availability of the necessary data (Graham 2001). It is therefore 
reasonable, that market value would have a greater association Wlth option granting. 
4.2.6 Overall Results Excluding the Financial Sector 
The financial sector differs to the other sectors firstly because these firms do not incur 
expenditure on research and development, and secondly because their long term debt and 
assets include unique components, such as amounts OW1I1g to or due from depositors and 
policyholders. TIurdly, the liquidity !>'tatus of such firms is often calculated differently to 
other firms. As a result of these issues, separate tests were conducted on the ranked data 











4.2.6.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression 
The results of the ordinary multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 4.3, Panel A. 
Ibe R2 and adjusted R2 values were 65% and 52% respectively, and the standard error of the 
estimate was 11.771. These values are very similar to the values obtained using the overall 
ranked data in 4.2.2.1 above, and the regression model is therefore just as meaningful. 
At the 1 % level bOth market value and research and development continued to be 
significantly positively associated with the option ratio, as did the industry variable at 5%. 
These results support those obtained using the overall ranked data, which suggests that the 
financial sector did not bias the previous results. However, one different result wa.<; that the 
moderate marginal tax rate variable was positively significant at 10%. These results suggest 
that non-financial firms are more likely to grant share options when they are in a moderate 
marginal tax rate position, although (as shown in 4.2.2.1) the sample of finns as a whole are 
more likely to grant share options when they are in a high marginal tax rate position. 
4.3 Additional Tests and Results 
4.3.1 Nonnal Scores with Absolute Variable for DROE 
The objective of this test was to determine whether the fact that the DROE was above or 
below target retum on equity would result in this variable being SIgnificantly assOCiated with 
the option ratio. The tests already discussed in 4.2 evaluated the extent to which the DROE 
was associated with the option ratio, whereas this test sought to determine whether positive 
or negative DROE's are significant drivers of option granting behaviour. If the DROE was 
positive it was given a value of one, and if it was negative, it was given a value of zero. The 
data used for the analysis was the normal scores data. 
4.3.1.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression 
The correlations between each of the independent variables and the option ratio can be seen 
in Table 4.4, Panel A 111e market value of the firm and the research and development 










variables were also sigrilficantly correlated with the option ratio in 4.2.2.1, before adjusting 
the DROE. 
The regression results are presented in Table 4.4, Panel B, and reveal an improved R2 of 62% 
and adjusted R2 of 51 %. The standard error of the estimate also improved from the original 
normal scores regression analysis to 0.64993. Therefore, this adjustment to the DROE has 
contributed towards a better regression model than the model from the original normal 
scores data. 
As was the case in 4.2.2.1 above, the market value of the firm was positively significant at 
1 %, but contrary to the above findings, research and development expenditure was positively 
significant at 1% and the industry variable and growth in assets were negatively significant at 
10%. The market-to-book ratio which was previously significant was not found to be 
significant in this test. In fact, the p-values of all the variables changed quite substantially, 
which implies that the other independent variables are quite sensitive to the DROE variable. 
The DROE itself was still not at all significant, even though it added significantly to the 
explanation of the error. 
4.3.1.2 Stepwise Multiple Regression 
A stepwise procedure was performed in order to determine whether the DROE would be 
selected as a variable .. The results contained within Table 4.4, Panel C, show that it was 
indeed selected. This reinforces the point made in 4.3.1.1 above that although the absolute 
variable of the DROE is not a significant variable, it does help explain a large amount of 
error in the data, possibly because the amount of error that the other variables were capable 
of explairilng was being reduced by the noise within the DROE variable. 
The four sigrilficant variables were identical to those that were sigrilficant in 4.3.1.1 above, 
however the industry and growth in assets variables became negatively sigrilficant at 5% 











4.3.2 The Resources Sector 
Due to the faa that the industry variable has been a significant variable on numerous 
occasions, further tests conducted on mdustries in isolation were considered meaningful. 
The industry that included the largest number of firms in the sample (twenty in total) is the 
resources seaor. A multiple regression analysis was conduaed on the ranked data 
penaining to the resources seaor, and the results are detailed in the seaions below. 
4.3.2.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression 
The results of the multiple regression model for the resources sector are in Table 4.5, Panel 
A, and reveal that the model was a good fit for the data, with an R2 of 89% and an adjusted 
R2 was 71 %. Although the standard error of the estimate was quite large at 9.8805, it was 
still smallerthan that of the ranked data in 4.2.1.1, and this model therefore appears to be 
one of the mO~l accurate models so far. 
The results were unusual compared to the overall results, in that the high marginal tax rate 
was slgnificantly positively associated with option granting at 5%. The market value and 
research and development expenditure variables were also significant, but only at 10%. It 
therefore appears that the faclors driving option granting behaviour in the resources industry 
differ to those driving the sample of firms as a whole. A common characteristic IS that large 
resource firms with growth opponunities appear to be more likely to grant options, and a 
unique characteristic is that resource firms in positive tax positions are more likely to gram 
options. This may also be as a result of the pecllliarities of the taxation of mining 
companies with cenain capital expenditure being deductible these provisions essentiaJJy 
place mining compames in a more favourable tax position than other companies and so [hey 
perhaps do not require the deduction for granting options. The limited life of [he mine may 
also promote the use of share schemes. 
4.3.2.2 After Adjusting for the Effects of Multicollinearity 
Many of the independent variables within the resources sector were highly correlated 











marginal tax rate variable, the ratio of the variance of market-adjusted returns to total returns 
and the market-to-book ratio were eliminated from the data. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis conduaed on the remaining variables is in 
Table 4.5, Panel C. The R2 and adjusted R2 remained high at 86% and 73% respeaively, 
which implies that the model is still explaining a large aillOlmt of the total error in the 
sample. Interestmgly, the three variables that were significant using ordinary mulople 
regression were all positively significant at 5%, as was the ratio of the variance in retum on 
equity to the variance in share price. However, the variance of market-adjusted retums was 
significantly negatively associated with option granting at 5%, which is inconsIstent with the 
results of Lewellen et al (1987), Smith and Watts (2992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993). 
Possible reasons for this were highlighted in 4.2.4.5 
Therefore, it appears that resource firms are not onJy more likely to grant share options 
when they are large with growth opportLulities and in a posItive tax posItion, they also appear 
to be more likely to grant options when there is small variance in the share price. 
Funhermore, when the noise in return on equity IS large relative to the noise in the share 
price, resource firms appear to grant more options, as was the case in Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) and Yermack (1995). 
4.3.3 'Granted' Finns 
The firms that granted share options were examined separately to determine whether the 
proportion of options granted was significantly associated with any of the independent 
variables, given that options were granted in the first place. 
4.3.3.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression 
'The resuJts of the ordinary multiple regression analysis are contained in Table 4.6, Panel A 
It can be seen from these results that the F-test (which tests the significance of the 
regression equation) was found nor to be statistically significant, given the p-value of 
0.27275. This implies that reliance on these results IS not appropriate. However for 











The low R2 value of 49% and in particular the low adjusted R2 value of 12% and the high 
~1andard error of the estimate funher suggest that the model does not fit the data well. The 
results show that the variance of market-adjusted returns is sigillficandy negatively associated 
with the proportion of options granted at 5%. The reason for this may be due to the faa 
that the majority of firms in the 'granted' sample are resource ftrms, and in 4.3.2.2 it was 
found that option granting was negatively associated with the vanance of market-adjusted 
firms in the resources sector. The market value and market-to-book racio are found to be 
slgillficandy positively associated with the proportion of options granted at 10%. 
The results (on which reliance should not be placed) therefore suggest that firms grant a 
greater proporuon of options to executive directors when the variance in the firm's share 
price is low, and when the finn is large and has growth opportunities. 
4.3.3.2 Stepwise Multiple Regression 
A stepwise multiple regression analysis was performed in order to establish whether a bener 
model for the data was available. The results in Table 4.6, Panel B reveal an improved 
adjusted R2 value of 26% and a smaller standard error of the estimate. The stepwise model 
is therefore a bener fit for the data, and yet the resu.lts are the same as those from the 
ordinary multiple regression model, except that the variance of market adjusted returns is 
negatively sigillficant at 1% rather than 5%. These results therefore support those in 4.3.3.1. 
4.3.4 Finns with a Positive DROE 
An additional test was performed on a sample of firms with a positive DROE to investigate 
what additional characteristics these firms possess with regard to option granting. Two 
multiple regression equations were conducted, firstly on the ranked data, and secondly on 
normal scores data. The following s results were obtained: 
4.3.4.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression on Ranked Data· 
The results are presented in Table 4.7, Panel A. The R2 of 73% and the adjusted R2 of 4)°1.) 
suggest a good fit, bur the standard error of the estimate of 11.679 implies that the 











operating cash flow to book value of eqlllty is negativeJy significant, which suggests that 
finns that have a positive DROE tend to grant options when liquidity is low which suppons 
the results of Klassen and Mawani (2000) and Yennack (1995). TIle market value of the 
finn was also significantly positively associated with the option ratio, as it has been in all of 
the previous results. 
4.3.4.2 Ordinary Multiple Regression on Nonnal Scores Data 
These results are presented in Table 4.7, Panel B. AJthough the R2 and adjusted R2 values 
declined to 63% and 39% respectively, the standard error of the estimate improved 
substantially to 0.80279. Thus, although the regression model from the ranked data 
explained more of the total error in the data, this regression model based on normal scores 
lies closer to the observed data points, and the results of both models should both be 
analysed. 
The results differ substantially from those in 4.3.4.1. At 5% the moderate marginal tax rate 
variable was significantly positively associated with option granting, and the high marginal 
tax rate variable, market value and research and development expenditure variable were aU 
significantly positive at 10%. TIlls implies that finns with a positive DROE grant options 
when they are in both moderate and high tax positions, when the firm is large (which is 
consistent with 4.3.4.1) and when their expenditure on research and development is large. 
The liquidity variable was not significant using normal scores, however only six companies in 
the entire sample had negative liquidity which reduces the likelihood of this variable being 
significant. The reasons for the differences between the results from the ranked data and 
those from the normal scores data are nOt known. Perhaps a similar study using a larger 
sample size will reveal clearer results. 
Based on the lack of definite results, it is not possible to ascribe to firms with a positive 











4.3.5 Firm's with a Negative DROE 
The finns that had negative DROE's were also separately analysed to detemune whether any 
other charaaenstics relating to option granting occur in such finns. Once again, the 
analysis was perfonned on both ranked and nonnal scores data, and the following results 
were obtained: 
4.3.5.1 Ordinary Multiple Regression on Ranked Data 
The results of the multiple regression analysis that was performed on ranked data is in Table 
4.8, Panel A. The RZ and adjusted RZ values of 81 % and 69% respectively imply that the 
model is very good. The standard error of the estimate was however quite large at 10.641. 
The results show that the market value is significantly positive at 1 %, the research and 
development expenditure variable is significantly positive at 5% and the debt-equity ratJo is 
significantly negative at 5%. The latter finding is inconsistent with Klassen and Mawani's 
(2000) results that a positive relationship exists between the debt-equity ratio and the option 
ratIo. 
These results suggest that finns with a negative DROE are more likely to grant options 
when they are large and research and development expenditure is high, both of which have 
been common significant variables in the previous results. The results also imply that firms 
with a negative DROE are more likely to grant options when debt is low relative to equity. 
A possible reason for this is that finns who are not achievmg a desired ROE may also be 
finns with high proportions of debt, and consequently options on the firm's shares may not 
appear to be very attraaive way of remuneratmg and motivating exeOJtives. Hence such 
finns would not grant options when debt levels are high, but rather when they are low. 
4.3.5.2 Ordinary Multiple Regression on Nonnal Scores Data 
Table 4.8, Panel B contains the results of this analySIS. Although the RZ was a rugh 72%, the 
adjusted RZ was a low 23%, and no variabJes from the model were significantly associated 
with option granting. Based on the low explanatOry power of the normal scores model and 











unique characteristic that can be attributed to firms with a negative DROE is a low debt-
equity ratio when granting share options. 
4.3.6 Summary of Additional Test Results 
The results of the tests described in 4.3.1 4.3.5 have been surrunarised in the table below. 
Table 4B Summary of Additional Test Results 
Adjusted for the Effects of 
Multicollinearity~._.~._+ ____ + ___ ~ ... _ --+-.-.--~ .. --~ .... - ... ~-l 
~. ____________ ~S_te~~~_M_u_l~tip~l_e_R~e~~_es_si_o_n-r-----.-~r_---.--.... _r.~.~-----~ ... ~---I 
Ordinary Multiple Re~ession: 
Firrn'swith a Positive DROE Ranked Data 
Ordinary Multiple Re~ession: 
I I Norrn~score_S_D_a_ta ____ ~ ____ .. _ .. __ r _________ ~~ _.~ .. ~~~.2~~=_. __ ~ Ordinary Multiple Re~essjon: 
.IF. inn's with a Negativ.e DROERanked Data MY 
~rdinary Multiple Re~ession: Norrn~ Scores Data ______ .--.• -. •.. . ~ •. - ••. --.--,_ ••• _ •. _ .••. _. __ J......... ____ . __ •. ______ .• __ J 
Key: 
D E Debt-Eqwty Ratio 
G ASSETS Five-year Growth in Assets 
I-IMTR High Marginal Tax Rate 
INDUSTRY Industry Dwnmy Variable 
R D Tbe Ratio of Research and Development Expenditure to T oral Assets 
MKT AD] 60-month Vanance of Market·adjusted Returns 
MM1RModerate Marginal Tax Rate 
MV Market Value 












The results of this study presented in this chapter are based on the methodologies outlined 
in Chapter 3 and indicate that South African firm's with a high market value or a high ratio 
of research and development expendirure to total assets or a low growth in assets are more 
likely to grant share options to executive direaors. In Chapter 1, it was stated that the areas 
that have been found to influence share option granting internationally are the pursuit of 
reduced agency costS, the firm's financial and tax position and finally SIze and! or liquidity. 
The results therefore imply that South African firms are not influenced by tax or financial 
performance nor by liquidity, but rather by flIm size and reduced agency COstS by pursuing 
long~term investment opportunities. 
Specifically, when the ranked data was analysed, market value and the ratio of research and 
development expendirure to total assets were significant at 1 %. One variable that appeared 
to be significantly negatively associated with the option ratio was the growth in assets. This 
negative association was contrary to the theory presented in previous research and the 
inconsistency is thought to relate to the faa that a greater nwnber of finns in the (granted' 
sample had a large negative growth in assets. 
Other variables that were found to be significantly positively associated with the option ratio 
were the industry dummy variable, the ratio of the variance in rerum on equity to the 
variance in share price, and to a small extent the high marginal tax rate variable. Contrary to 
the outcome, the buer variable was prediaed to be negatively associated with the option 
ratio. A possible reason for the contradicting result is that many of the firms that granted 
options were large successful finns that typically do not have assessed losses and are 
generally in a positive taxable income situation. As a result, they fell into the high marginal 
tax rate category and contributed towards the positive association. A multiple regression 
analysis was conducted on the ranked data excluding the financial sectOr and the results were 
consistent with those of the overall data, except that the moderate marginal tax rate vanable 











When the normal scores data was assessed, the equation that was produced explained less of 
the error in the data than the equation processed from the ranked data. It did however have 
a lower standard error of the estimate, which implies that the liner equation lies very close to 
the observed values. This model revealed that the market value wa.s significantly positively 
associated with the option ratio, which reinforced the results from the ranked data. The 
ratio of research and development expenillture to total assets was found to be significantly 
positively associated with option granting, and growth in assets was once again negatively 
associated with the option ratio. The market-tO-book ratio was found to be significantly 
negatively associated with the option ratio, although a positive relationship was predicted. A 
possible reason for this was that on average the firms in the 'not granted' sample had a 
higher market-to-book ratio. 
The variables that consistently lacked significance were the deviation from target return on 
equity; the moderate marginal tax rate variable; the debt-equity ratio; the ratio of the 
operating cash flow to book value of equity; the variance of market-adjusted returns and the 
ratio of the variance of market-adjusted returns to the variance in total returns. Other tests 
that were conducted included substituting the DROE variable with one or zero depending 
on whether the deviation from target retum on equity was positive or negative, and 
performmg a multiple regression analysis. This test was conducted to provide an indication 
of whether the fact that the deviation was positive or negative revealed any funher firm 
characteristics relating to option granting. The DROE variable was found not to be 
significant, but the market value, ratio of research and development expenditure to total 
assets, growth in assets and industry variables continued to be significantly positively 
assoCIated v.~th option granting. When the resources sector was separately analysed, the 
results showed that firms in the resources sector are more likely to grant share options when 
they are in a high taxable income position; are large; have high expenillture on research and 
development relative to total assets and have more noise in their eanlings relative to share 
price. Furthermore, and contrary to theory, when resource firms have a low variance in their 
share price, they are more likely to grant options. 
eThe firms that granted options were also analysed separately, and suppon was provided thdf 











variance of the firm's share price and positively associated with the firm's market value and 
market-tO-book ratio. When the firms with a positive DROE were scrutinised, conflicting 
results were obtained, and thus no conclusion was drawn as to the drivers of option granting 
in such firms. The drivers of option granting for firms with a negative DROE were also 
unclear, but a low debt-eqUity ratio was found to be a unique significant factor. 
4.5 Tables 
Key: 
• All significant relationships at 1 % or less are in bold italics 
• All significant relationships at greater than 1% but less than 5% are in bold. 
• All significant relationships at gre;lter than 5% but less than 10% have been marked 
with an astensk;{-. 
• All correlations at 5% or less are in bold. 
• All correlations at greater than 5% but less than 10% have been marked with an 
asterisk*. 
4.5.1 Glossary 
OPTION R Option Ratio 
DROE Deviation from Target Return on Equity 
HM1R High Marginal Tax Rate 
MlvITR 
DE 
Moderate Marginal Tax Rate 
Debt-Equity Ratio 
OCF-BV Operating Cash flow to Book Value of Equity 
MY Market Value 
MKT _ADJ 60-momh Variance of Market-adjusted Returns 
Jv1ADLTOT Ratio of the 60-momh Variance of Market-adjusted Returns to Total Returns 
G ASSETS Five-year Growth in Assets 
MY BV Market-to-Book Ratio 
R D Ratio of research anddevelopmem expenditure to Total Assets 
INDUSTRY Industry Dummy Variable 










TABLE 4.1 RANKED DATA 
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VROE VSP 0.26478 
Panel B: Ordinary Multiple Regression 
Regression Surrunary for Dependent V ariabl~; OPTION_R 
R= .80709090 RZ= .65139572 Adjusted R2= .55497326 















Panel C: Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependent V mabie: OPTION _ R 
R= .78895453 R'= .62244925 Adjusted R2= .57258406 
12.483 Std.Error of estimace: 11.606 
0.00000 
0.00399 
~::c_-:-::::==:::-__ --t_O-=-.-::24-:;-8:-::1 5c::--+_-::0-::.1-;:-02::;::6::::2~ic--"-:::--:::--:C::-:;;:--T---:::-;::-=:-;:---+---::2:-:.4:-;-1872::-::0:----+-O:01907=l 
-0.21473 -2.36603 0.02167 i 
-0.13191 -1.40412 0.16612 
-0.16001 ---r---::--c-:--=-:-i-----:::-:-:-:::-::-:::---t--_-:-1.·745::-c4-=-27=---+---0'.15177 
0.12730 1.42423 
Panel D: Correlations between Independent Variables 




DROE 1.00000! ! 
~ .. ~ --_ .. 
HMIR -0.11733: 1.00000 
'::-;_ .. 
-0.02908 ·0.76348 1.00000 MMTR 
iD_E 0.25605 -0.20487 0.25207: 1.00000 
iOCF BV 0.00677 0.31102 -0.155121 0.11951 
~ 0.12068 0.05029 -?:075~2L_ ·0.01195 
MKT AD] 0.21333 0.11361 -0.05623 -0.22073· 
"MAD]JOT -0.03813 -0.14527 0.07368 0055949 
G ASSETS -0.18720 ~??5871_-0.00582 -0.14707 
MV BV 0.06891 0.16762! -0.07756 -0.00243 
RD 0.12713 0.11547 -0.13767 -0.33860 
.. _ .. 
INDUSTRY 0.09927 -0.04667 0.1349~ 0.29947 
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Panel E: Adjusted for the Effects of Multicollinearity 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION_R 
R= .79082117 R2= .62539813 Adjusted R2= .55047775 
( f F 10,50)= 8.3475 p< .00000 Std. Error 0 estrrnare: 11.903 
St. Err. 




IDROE ·0.00341 0.11362 -0.00341 
.MMIR -0.00033 0.09178 -0.01228 
ID_E -0.13079 0.10598 -0.13079 
!MV 0.84127 0.11064 0.84127 
_ .. _. 
MKT_ADJ -0.14443 0.12111 -0.14443 
rG ASSETS* -0.19767* 0.10269 -0.19767 
MY BV -OOhh'iO 0.10671 -0.06650 
IR_D 0.27592 0.09930 0.27592 
INDUSTRY 0.26195 0.10890 I 2.07475 
VROE VSP 0.13759 0.10381 0.13759 
SL 
ofB [(50) p-level 
7.18037 0.28254 0.77870 
0.11362 -0.03003 0.97616 
3.36540 -0.00365 0.99710 
0.10598 1.23414 0.22292 
0.11064 i 7.60346 0.00000 
0.-121111 -1.19254--- 0.23868 
0.10269 -1.92488 0.05994* I 
0.10671 -0.62322 0.53598 
0.09930 2.77857 ! 0.00767 
0.86255 2.40537 0.01990 











TABLE 4.2: NORMAL SCORES DATA 
Panel A: Correlations with the Dependent Variable 
Pane] B: Ordinary Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION_R 
R= .68955188 Rl= .47548180 Adjusted Rl= .32724839 











Panel C: Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependent V mabie: OPTION _ R 
R= .66531817 R2= .44264826 Adjusted R2= .39104162 
F(5,54)= 8.577 4 .00000 Std.Error of eStimate: .75208 
B 
iIntercept 0.01578 
IMV . 0.58624 0.11532 0.59306 
---
.G ASSETS"" -0.20947* 0.11247 -0.21230 
I .~ 
l~,-D _~_~ 0.24410 0.11231 ! 0.24406 
'VROE VSP 0.17207 0.17440 







Panel D: Correlations between Independent Variables 
, DROE H1vfIR .M:MTR D.E OCF .. BV 
IDROE ! 1.00000 I 
HMIR 0.07780 1.00000 
b~' 
MMIR -0.09320 -0.76089 1.00000 
DE 0.14393 0.18089 -0.22726 1.00000 
OCF BV ·0.13239 ·0.32256 0.17245 0.12408 1.00000 
ro-.... _-_ .... -
.'v1V 0.07492 -0.18142 0.10187 -0.01143 0.25171 
MAD] 0.09543 -0.10759 0.05768 -0.21790 0.16039 
MADJJOT 0.00426 0.12959 ·0.05380 0.58703 -0.12111 
'G ASSETS -0.21033 -0.26445 0.19538 -0.24936 0.19756 
MY BV 0.02239 -0.10168 0.19169 , 0.03676 0.00015 
IR_D 0.03248 -0.10838 0.13747 -0.30693 -0.01278 
INDUSTRY ·0.08624 0.03002 0.03011 0.15019 -0.02309 











0.28935 i 1.00000 
-0.18979 ·0.61788 1.00000 
0.27762 0.12556 -0.10672 , 
0.38621 0.24393 -0.11601 I 
0.33277 0.29218 -0.28002 ! 
0.38523 -0.14630 0.26807 











Panel E: Adjusting for the Effects of Multicollinearity 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION _ R 
R= .68664605 RZ= .47148280 Adjusted R2= .35036428 
F(ll ,48) = 3.8927 p< .00048 Std. Error of esrimare: .77679 
St. Err. ,-------,--::--=::----r-----.. - .. ,----~__, 
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TABLE 4.3: OVERALL RESULTS EXCLUDING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Panel A: Ordinary Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependem V mabJe: OrnON _ R 
R= _80481683 R2= .64773013 Adjusted RZ= .52052157 
F(13,36)=5D919 p<DOO05 Srd.Error of escimate: 1 ]]71 
SL Err. SL Err. 
BETA of BETA B of B 
Imercept ·15.79565 1H8924 
DROE 0.00748 0.00709 0.13916 
HMTR 0.32221 10.87946 6.59125 
1vIMTR* 0.34697* 0.18970 12.16446 6_65087 
D E -0.26089 0.15974 -0.24512 0.15008 -
OCF BV -0.06073 0.14087 -0.06252 0_14502 
MV 0.87257 0.15817 0.85068 0.15420 
MKT AD] -0.18392 -0.16861 0.19391 -0.86950 
MAD] JOT 0.19456 0.18696 0.20171 0.92686 
-0.14294 -0.14127 0.12994 -1.08721 
-0.06004 ·0_05721 0.15525 -0_36850 
0.41160 0.12976 3.16042 
: INDUSTRY 0.30356 0.95140 2.19201 0.03493 











TABLE 4.4: NORMAL SCORES WITH ABSOLUTE V ARlABLE FOR DROE 




DROE 0.23374 I 
'HMTR -0.08910 
• :tv11v11R () ()')') 7') 
!D_E -0.10979 
• 
OCF BV 0.00447 I 
MV 0.60998 
!MAD] 0.21735 
MAD] TOT -0.14072 
!G_ASSETS -0.03995 
MY BV 0.12444 
R_D 0.36120 
I INDUSTRY 0.06403 
VROE VSP 0.23720 
Panel B: Ordinary Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependem VariabJe: OPTION 
R= .78722079 Rl= .61971657 Adjusted Rl= .51224516 
F(13,46)= 5.7663 p<.OOOOO Std.Error of estimate: .64993 
! St. Err. 
BETA Of BETA 
Imercept 
iDROE 0.09095 I 0.10769 
.... 
.HMTR -0.24397 . 0.15569 
MMTR -0.17623 0.14972 
D E 934 0.13591 
OCFBV -0.11749 0.11966 - .. -.. ~-------------. 
MV 0.75175 0.11842 
I MAD] ! -0.09392 0.15474 




"MY BV -0.02373 0.13148 
fRD 032208 0.09985 
rtNnUSTRY* -0.21504* 0.12058 

















of B [(46) p-level 
0.29294 1.93366 0.05932 
0.20441 ~:~40272 
0.28751 -1.56702 .12396 
0.28967 -1.17708 0.24522 
0.13816 -0.51020 0.61235 
0.11629 -0.98185 0.33131 
0.11568 6.34824 0.00000 
0.14958 -0.60694 0.54687 
0.18299 0.43513 0.66551 
0.10566 ·1.79494 0.07923;;-
0.12980 -0.18045 0.85759 
0.09659 3.22565 0.00232 
0.05010 ·1.78339 0081---












Panel C: Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION_R 
R= .76882756 R2= .59109581 AdjuSLed R2= .53605102 
F(7,52}= 10.738 p<.OOOOO Std. Error of eSLimate: .63387 
SL Err. 
1St 1 1\ Of BETA 
Intercept 
MV 0.73031 0.10892 
~ ............. -
RD 0.33512 0.09476 
-
INDUSTRY" -0.20836'" 0.10748 
G ASSETS" -0.21487'" 0.09588 
DROE 0.10783 0.09279 
VROE VSP 0.12513 0.09358 
MAD] -0.11757 0.11551 
~EIT fB r(52) p-level 
0.19373 0.19069 1.01597 0.31435 
0.71340 0.10640 6.70502 0.00000 
0.32417 0.09166 3.53662 0.00086 




0.20467 0.17612 1.16210 0.25050 
0.12246 0.09158 1.33717 0.18699 
• 











TABLE 4.5: RESOURCES SECTOR 
Panel A: Ordinary Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependem Variable: OPTION_R 
R= .94547118 Rl= .89391575 Adjusted Rl= .71205703 
F(12,7}=4.9154 p<.G2170 Std. Error of estimate: 9.8805 
~ St, Err. BETA Of BETA • B 
ilmercept -14.03876 
.DROE -0.26274 0.23349 -0.26480 
IHMTR 0.64188 0.24984 23.51463 
I JviMTR 0.29073 0.26719 11.38591 
iD,E ·0.24033 0.42056 -0.22760 
IOCFBV -0.12320 0.27817 -0.11712 
!MVe, 0.58031* 0.24958 0.59797 
IMKT _AD] -0.46867 0.35779 -0.60641 
MAD]JOT 0.38446 0.61350 0.36711 
G ASSETS i 0.02812 0.21540 0.03208 
-------
MV BV -0.02204 0.47226 -0.02477 
R_D" 0.49585* 0.22657 0.63292 
VROE VSP 0.51578 0.33336 0.47751 
Pand B: Correlations between Independent Variables 
S1. Err. 
ofB I [(7) p-Ievel 
35.33325 -0.39732 0.70296 
0.23533 -1.12525 0.29758 
9.15276 2.56913 0.03705 
i 
10.46406 i 1.08810 0.31259 
0.39827 -0.57146 0.58556 
0.26444 I -0.44289 0.67121 ! 
.... --_.-
0.25718 2.32512 0.05299* • 
,-~ 




0.24572 0.13055 0.89981 
0.53082 -0.04666 0.96409 
0.28920 2.18854 0.06482;':-
0.30862 1.54722 0.16573-
DROE HMIR MMfR DE OCF BV MY MKT_ADJ MADLTU!'J 
.DROE 1.00000 I 
.. 
HMfR 0.46311 1.00000 I 
MMTR -0.53675 -0.80178 1.00000 
D_E ·0.22850 0.07432 0.05412 1.00000 
: 
OCF_BV 0.07035 0.51900 ,0.43924 0.01132 1.00000 ! 
'MV 0.10976 0.13947 -0.08520 0.16918 0.31980 1.00000 
'MKT_ADJ 0.33082 0.31052 ·0.22340 -0.25675 0.20909 0.34010 1.00000 ruo -0.34495 -0.10861 0.11030 ! 0.81222 -0.1 0104 -0.16664 -0.48486 1.00000 T , ,G ASSETS' -0.00728 -0.03763 i 0.01110 -0.10411 0.06902 0.62359 0.46992 -0.24]14 -
I 
MY BV 0.31816 0.21861 • -0.15990 -1).20W) 0.51305 0.60128 0.64949 0.28924 c::....:..:::-
RD 0.48963 0.03484 -0.15986 -0.44946 ·0.26240 0.10491 0.09722 ·0.39696 












Panel C: Adjusted For the Effects of Multicollinearity 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION _ R 
R= .92529636 Rl= .85617335 AdjuSted Rl= .72672937 
F(9,10)=6.6142 p<.00337 Srd.Error of eStimate: 9.6255 
Sr. Err. 
BETA of BETA 
Imercepr 
DROE -0.33723 0.18864 
HMTR 0.40935 0.17488 
DE 0.07109 0.20262 
OCF BV -0.13354 0.16994 
MV 0.50455 0.21403 
MKT AD] -0.51750 0.17085 
G ASSETS 0.03098 0.19307 
RD 0.49477 0.19932 













ofB r(10) p-level 
15.43172 0.22481 0.82666 
0.19012 -1.78763 0.10413 
6.40650 2.34075 0.04129 
0.19189 0.35083 0.73300 
0.16155 -0.78583 0.45018 
0.22055 2.35739 0.04013 
0.22106 -3.02901 0.01270 
0.22026 0.16048 0.87570 
0.25442 2.48229 0.03242 










TABLE 4.6: 'GRANTED' FIRMS 
Panel A: Ordinary Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependent Yariable: OP1l0N ~ R 
R= .69181112 R2= .47860262 Adjusted R2= .12185705 
F(13,19)= 1.3416 p< .27275 Std. Error of estimate: 9.0613 
Sr. Err. 
BETA of BETA 
Intercept 
DROE -0.07884 0.25926 
HMTR 0.06201 0.34748 
MMTR -0.11221 0.35747 
D E 0.26798 0.27995 
OCF BY -0.43673 0.24729 
MV~' 0.36754* 0.21358 
MKT~ADJ -0.95309 0.35449 
MADLTOT -0.50560 0.40085 
G ASSETS -0.13902 0.28084 
MV BY" 0.53909* 0.31167 
RD 0.34660 0.21275 
INDUSTRY 0.16183 0.20957 
VROE YSP 0.23650 0.27380 
Panel B: Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Regression Summary for Dependent Yariable: OPTION ~ R 
R= .64676553 R2= .41830565 Adjusted R2= .25543123 
F{7,25)=2.5683 p<.Q3863 Std.Error of estimate: 8.3437 
Sr. Err. 
BETA of BETA 
Intercept 
MKT AD] -0.86578 0.26541 
MV~' 0.29896" 0.16775 
MV BV" 0.44533" 0.23402 
MADLTOT -0.25281 0.23698 
OCFBV -0.30238 0.19166 
RD 0.23406 0.16426 


























of B t(19) p-Ievel 
15.51970 1.33383 0.19803 
0.25926 -0.30408 0.76437 
6.69460 0.17845 0.86026 
7.22048 -0.31390 0.75702 
0.27995 0.95726 0.35046 
0.24729 -1.76605 0.09345 
0.21358 1.72086 0.10151" 
0.35449 -2.68866 0.01454 
0.40085 -1.26133 0.22246 
0.28084 -0.49501 0.62627 
0.31167 1.72969 0.09990~' 
0.21275 1.62916 0.11975 
1.01035 0.77221 0.44949 
0.27380 0.86375 0.39850 
Sr. Err. 
of B t(25) p-Ievel 
8.89703 2.38005 0.02525 
0.26541 -3.26206 0.00319 
0.16775 1.78219 0.08681" 
0.23402 1.90298 0.0686r 
0.23698 -1.06682 0.29625 
0.19166 -1.57772 0.12720 
0.16426 1.42493 0.16654 












TABLE 4.7: FIRM'S WITH A POSITIVE DROE 
-~"'--
Panel A: Ordinary Multiple Regression on Ranked Data 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION _ R 
R= .85158699Rl= .72520041 AdjustedRl= .42750085 
F(13,12)=2.4360 p<.06660 StclError of estunare: 11.679 
SL Err, 
BETA Of BETA B 
Intercept 42.08958 
DROE -0.34073 0.20246 -0.68760 
iHMTR 0.36948 0.22967 11.31902 
iMMTR 0.37867 0.26776 12.04703 
DE 0.06076 0.33499 0.05115 
OCF BV -0.65098 
O.28~:::::%~~r iMV t=¥,2533 Q220 81 
IMKTAD] .22000 0.38721 .19571 
MAD] TOT -0.42046 0.45570 ·0.38075 
~ASSETS -0.27653 0.23642 ·0.24564 
MY BV 0.46744 0.33546 0.35586 
RD 0.01848 0.22289 0.01636 
lNDUS1RY 0.19932 0.28844 1.49161 


















Panel B: Ordinary Multiple Regression on Nonnal Scores Data 
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: OPTION R 
R= .79310162R2= .62901018 AdjustedRl= .39292574 
F(14,22)= 2.6643 p<.01930 StclError of estimate: .80279 
SL Err. 
BETA B of B 
Imercept 




........... - ....... 
-0.02761 -0.03218 
MY" , 0.68820'" 0.76706 
MAD] 0.03083 0.D3057 
MADLTOT 0.35407 0.27029 0.36866 0.28143 
G ASSETS -0.15419 0,20173 ·0.16427 0.21493 
MY BV -0,14978 0,21365 ·0,19419 
0* 0,32122" 8587 0,33026 
-0.29064 0.19864 
0.09816 0.34280 






































TABLE 4.8: FIRM'S WITH A NEGATIVE DROE 
Panel A: Ordinary Multiple Regression on Ranked Data 
Regression Summary for Dependent V mabIe: OPTION _ R 
R= .89941296 Rl= .80894367 Adjusted R2= .69067070 
F(1 6.8396 Std.Error of estimate: 10.641 
0.97787 















Panel B: Ordinary Multiple Regression on Nonnal Scores Data 
Regression Summary for Dependent Vanable: OPTION _ R 
R= .84945401 R2= .72157211 AdjustedRl= .23432330 
1.4809 1 Sed.Error of estimate: .75495 
0.50723 
-0.~~1~! __ -.l 0.33102 -0.72210 
-0.70269 i 0.40663 -1.21493 
-0.52429 
-0.02825 0.36526 
-0.11338 0.33130 0.28304 
0.60232 0.65614 0.51119 0.55686 
-0.20377 0.34492 -0.21517 0.36423 







6.12660 ~~~D -1.19886 
1.17219 
0.09783 __ O.9~29 I 
0.46583 . 
0.0464'2-1 
1.51661 0.14428 i 
















5.1 The Re~earch Study 
Research conduaed overseas has shown that firm's grant share options to executive 
direaors to firstly align therr interests with those of the shareholders so as to reduce agency 
costs; secondJy because there is no requirement to expense share options in the income 
statement and a financial reporting benefit therefore exists; and thirdly to utilise sltuations 
when the firm is paying low levels of taxation because firms cannOt obtain a tax deduaion 
when they grant share options. Although the international evidence appears to be 
conclusive that the pursuit of reduced agency COsts is a key driver for share option granting, 
the studies conduaed have occaSIOnally yielded conflicting results with regard to identifying 
proxies for agency costs that are significantly associated with option grantIng and the 
financial reporting and taxatlon issues surrounding share option granting. 
Prior to this study, none of the theories suggested overseas had been tested in South Africa. 
The objeaive of this studywas therefore to determine which of the relevant haors 
previously tested overseas influence share option granting to South African executive 
direaors. Specifically, this study sought to determine whether finns are more likely to grant 
share options to executive direaors (a) in order to reduce agency costs, and! or (b) to 
capitalise on financial reporting benefits, and! or (c) to advantage of their taxable 
Income sltuatlon. 
To accomplish this, 6] firms over the period 2000 to 2001 were seleaed, and the proportion 
of the value of share options granted to total executive compensation (known as the option 
ratio) was regressed against thirteen Independent variables comprising proxies for agency 
COstS, financial reporting and taxation status, finn size and Liquidity. This methodology was 
used by Klassen and Mawaru (2000), and is sirniJar to that used by Matsunaga (1995), 











The dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes model was used to value the share options granted, and 
the option ratio was calrulated as tills value divided by the sum of this value and total cash 
compensation for the year. The proxies for agency COstS included the variance of market-
adjusted returns to represent the type of Investments management are pursuing; the market-
to-book ratio, the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets and the five-
year growth in aSsets to represent long-term investments and growth opportunities, the 
variance of market-adjusted returns to total returns to represent the noise in share price 
relative to the market; the variance of retum on equity to the variance of share price to 
capture the noise in earnings relative to the noise in the share price, and an industry dummy 
vanable to capture differences in option granting behaviour across indmtries. 
The two financial reponing proxies were the deviation from the firm's target return on 
equity had an expense been recognised for share options and secondly the debt-equity ratio 
to capture cash flow constraints resulting from debt. The firm's tax status was determined 
by whether the firm had positive or negative taxable income and whether there were any 
assessed losses. Firm size was represented by market value and liquidity constraints were 
measured by the ratio of operating cash flow to the book value of equity. 
Due to the non-normality and non-linearity of the data, the data was normalised using two 
techniques suggested by Cooke (1998) namely, rank regression and normal scores. 
'The reswts suggest that South African firms are more likely to compensate their executive 
direaors with share options when the firm is large and has future growth opportunities 
(represented by the ratio of research and development to tOtal assets), which is consistent 
with the theory that firm's grant options to reduce the COsts of agency between management 
and shareholders. Two variables were statistically significant but in the opposite direaion to 
what was expeaed: growth in assets and the market-tO-book ratio. Having analysed the 
data however, a larger sample size may have provided a different result. 
The variables that were not found to significantly influence option granting were the 
financial reporting, tax and liquidity variables, as weJJ as two proxies for agency CO:.1S (the 
variance of market-adjusted returns and the ratio of the variance of market-adjusted retums 











when they have highly variable share rerurns and! or highly variable share returns relative to 
the market. The results also suggest that the lack of a requirement to recognise an expense 
for share options, the lack of a tax deduction, and low liquidity within the firm do not 
influence the decision to grant share options in South Africa. This implies that the release 
of ED 160 Share-based Paymmt should not effect the firm's decision to grant options. Other 
implications are that if SARS were to consider allowing a tax deduction for share options 
granted, this should also not effect the finn's decision of whether or not to grant options. 
Additional tests that were conducted included analysing only the firms that granted options. 
It was found that the larger the firm and its growth opportunities (represented by the 
market-to-book ratio) and the lower the variance of its share returns, the greater the 
proportion of options granted. The resources sector was also separately analysed and the 
variables that were found to drive share option granting by these firms were the same as 
those that were identified for the sample as a whole, except that firm's with a high taxable 
income position and a low share price variance were also more likely to grant options. 
Another test was conducted to indicate whether the faa that the deviation from target return 
on equity was positive or negative influenced the granting of options. The results showed 
that it was not a significant driver of share option granting. Other tests that were conducted 
on firms with only positive or only negative deviations from their target return on equity 
revealed conflicting results. 
S.2 Future Research 
A number of possible areas of future research have been identified through this study. 
Some of the more significant areas are discussed below. 
The results have not succeeded in revealing why so many share option schemes have failed 
in South Africa. Had the financial reporting and taxation proxies been found to be 
signiflcant then an implicatIon of this would have been that firm's grant options depending 
on their own monetary circumstances, and not necessarily because it is the most appropnate 
form of compensation for all parries concerned. Future research exists ll1 the form of 










TIlls study may also reveal different re::.ults if it can be repeated on a larger scale. If the 
quality of share option disclosure improves, this may be a worthwhile exercise. 
A similar study using different variables or measurement techniques to determine prmaes for 
agency, financial or taxation may also provide further insight into option granting behaviour. 
If the tax position of the company, instead of the group, can be ascertained, more 
meaningful results may be found. 
Finally, a study that examines the future consequences of share option grants, such as 
whether characteristics of the fum change subsequent to the granting of share options may 
be usefuL 
5.3 Closing Remarks 
This study has provided some guidance as to what the key drivers of share option grants in 
South Africa are. It has resulted in a deeper understanding of why and when firms decide 
to grant share options. Furthermore, it has provided some insight mto the potential future 
impact of ED 160 Share-based Payments on the decision to grant share options and any 
possible future tax amendments regarding the deductibility of share options. It has 
empirical results that can be compared to those found internationally, and has identified 













Appendix A: 100 LARGEST FIRi\1S BASED ON MARKET CAPITALISATION 
AT 1/10/01 ON THEJSE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ABI Kersaf 
Absa Libeny 
AECI Libeny International 
Aflife Lonmin 
African Bank MCell 
Afrox Malbak 
Afrox Health Massmart 
Alexander Forbes Mediclinic 
Allan Gray Properties Metro Cash & Cany 
Allied Technologies Metropolitan Life 
Anglo American MJH 
Anglo Platinum Mner 
Anglogold Murray & Robberts 




AVl Nedcor Investment Bank 
Avmin Netcare 
Barloworld New Clicks 
BHP Billiton Northam 
Bidvest Old Mutual 
BoE OTK 
Capital Pick 'n Pay 
Caxton PPC 
Comparex Rand Merchant Bank Holdings 
Copi Rebhold 
Coronation Holdings Remgro 
CIP Reunert 
Delta Richemont 
Didata SA Breweries 
Discovery SA Eagle 
Distell Sanlam 
! 
Durban Deep Roodepoort Santam 
Edcon Sappi 
Ellenne Sasol 



















Implats T nlVlorrhs 
Invesrec Unirrans 
!scor Venfin 
Group Western Areas 
Wooltru 



















































NOT GRANTED NOT GRANTED 
Allied Technologies AECl 
Assmang Afrox 






Iscor Sun International 
Johnnie Communications Supergroup 
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